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The Law of War and the Responsibility to Protect
Civilians: A Reinterpretation
Thomas H. Lee*
Two seemingly unrelated crises implicating the law of war and the responsibility to protect civilians
have arisen in recent years. In 2013, the United States considered military intervention without U.N.
Security Council preapproval in Syria after discovering that the government had exterminated its own
people with chemical agents. In 2014, Russia sent troops into Crimea, a part of Ukraine, to protect ethnic
Russians that Russia claimed were in danger after a political coup in the country. In both cases, the
military acts contemplated or undertaken were of dubious legality, albeit under different rubrics. This
Article aims to show how analysis of the lawfulness of military intervention in Syria and Crimea is
illuminated by recognizing that both are subspecies of the same problem and may thus be seen as one
customary doctrine of international law governing the grounds for war. By custom, a sovereign state may
use force in another unconsenting sovereign state without U.N. Security Council authorization or a self-
defense justification to protect civilians facing imminent risk of group extermination—a threshold that
was arguably met in Syria but seemingly not in Crimea. The right to use armed force in such instances is
further constrained by the proportionality and exhaustion-of-other means requirements that generally ap-
ply to the law of war.
This customary legal right to use force was traditionally limited to protecting the lives of the interven-
ing state’s own civilians for two related reasons. First, the bedrock principle of exclusive sovereignty
shielded a target state’s treatment of its civilians within its borders. Second, there was a consensus that
international law did not permit the use of armed force to enforce the right against death of civilians in
another country absent the nexus of nationality to the victims. However, in the past dozen years, both
principles have been fatally undermined by the norm of the “responsibility to protect” civilians, which
pierces the veil of sovereignty for states that harm or fail to protect their own peoples. Consequently, the
present customary international law of war can reasonably be construed as extending the ancient unilat-
eral civilian-protection use-of-force easement to the use of force to protect all civilians facing state-sponsored
mass killings, regardless of nationality.
The life-saving easement on sovereign territory logically covers only cases where civilians are facing
group death—genocide, massacre killings, or lethal use of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons—
initiated by the host state which is violating its duty to protect the people within its territory. U.N.
Security Council authorization or a self-defense justification is still required for military interventions in
response to other mass atrocities such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, state-initiated individual killings,
non-lethal crimes against humanity (for example, systemic torture), or the possession (or non-lethal use) of
weapons of mass destruction, and to humanitarian crises where deaths are not caused by the state or its
agents. Of course, any intervening state’s decision to use armed force to protect its own or foreign civilians
in an unconsenting state is ultimately a matter of its own domestic law and policy choice, but interna-
tional law does not prohibit such a choice in the face of state-initiated mass killings.
* Leitner Family Professor of International Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Nick Pastan and
Alex McCabe for research assistance, and to Henry Monaghan, Sam Moyn, Peter Spiro, and Matt Wax-
man for comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to participants in workshops at Fordham Law
School and Harvard Law School for their questions and suggestions.
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Introduction
The “Responsibility to Protect” civilians, commonly known by the acro-
nym “R2P,” began as a twenty-first century repackaging of humanitarian
intervention after the world community’s inconsistent, and sometimes indif-
ferent, reactions to the great human rights disasters of the last decade of the
twentieth century. R2P is not just one concept but rather a cluster of ideas
centered upon a sovereign state’s responsibility to protect its people. It has
three key premises: (1) a sovereign state has a basic responsibility to protect
civilians within its borders; (2) the rest of the world has a responsibility to
ensure that every state honors its responsibility to protect; and (3) if a state
fails in its responsibility, then other states may use all necessary means, in-
cluding armed force, to protect the lives of the civilians at risk.1 The deep
purpose of R2P is to undermine the principle of exclusive sovereignty—the
idea that a sovereign state has autonomy within its own territory and that no
other state has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its
people, especially by force of arms.
This Article focuses on the use-of-force component of R2P, which is re-
ferred to herein as “forcible R2P.” But military intervention is only one of a
range of measures that other countries may take to support the responsibil-
ity to protect in troubled states. Indeed, in recent years, R2P advocates fo-
cused most of their attention on R2P’s non-coercive and preventative
features2 until the U.N. Security Council’s invocation of the responsibility
to protect civilians as justification for forcible intervention in Libya in 2011
brought R2P’s military aspect front and center.3 Although the responsibility
to protect, and specifically forcible R2P, has generated much commentary,
it remains unclear how it relates to the international law of war governing
the reasons for the use of armed force, which is known by the Latinism jus
ad bellum.
R2P may be a relatively new concept, but since ancient times, the law of
war has recognized the unilateral right of a sovereign to use armed force
within the territory of another unconsenting state in order to protect the
1. See generally Int’l Comm’n on Intervention & State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect (2001) [hereinafter ICISS Report]. This Report, commissioned by the Canadian government,
is the urtext of the R2P movement. An early academic formulation of basic R2P concepts in response to
the humanitarian crises of the 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa is a monograph published by the Brooking
Institution. Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in
Africa (1996). My description of R2P’s three key components tracks the three “pillars” of R2P articu-
lated in the ICISS Report and other R2P literature.
2. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes
Once and For All (2008).
3. See infra Part I.B. See also Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On, 24 Ethics
and Int’l Aff. 143 (2010). Bellamy gives a thorough account of the demilitarization of R2P
shepherded by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and its non-military invocations with respect to the
human rights situations in various countries between 2003 and 2009. American scholars tend to give
short shrift to the non-armed force aspects of R2P, which, though less spectacular, constitute the major-
ity of its invocations at the United Nations and in international policy circles.
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lives of its own civilians there, or the foreign civilians of allied states. The
right of a state under international law to use armed force to protect its
civilians abroad was extremely robust as late as the early twentieth century.
In fact, for centuries, the modern law of war sanctioned the right of a state
to use armed force to protect not only the lives of their civilians in other
countries, but also their property. The perceived legality of war to protect the
property interests of nationals declined precipitously in the decade after the
end of the Second World War. It was effectively retired after the abortive
1956 British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt to protect foreign sharehold-
ers’ interests in the Suez Canal, which Gamal Abdel Nasser had national-
ized. But the idea that a state has the right under international law to use
force in unconsenting foreign states to protect the bodily interests of its own
civilians—or the civilians of other third countries—has endured to the pre-
sent day, as witnessed by its invocation to help justify military interventions
by Belgium in the Congo in 1960, by Israel in Uganda in 1976, by the
United States in Grenada in 1982 and Panama in 1989, by France in Chad
in 2006, and by Russia in South Ossetia in 2008 and in Crimea in 2014.4
This Article shall call the centuries-old international law “right to protect”
civilians of the intervening state or its friends “r2p.” r2p, unlike R2P, is law
of ancient vintage, but it is uncelebrated and unloved by international law-
yers because they often see powerful states with far-flung interests invoking
it as a pretext to attack weaker states.
This Article’s basic claim is that r2p and R2P are conceptually homolo-
gous and that together they constitute a single customary international law
ground for unilateral humanitarian intervention in an unconsenting state
where civilians are facing group extermination. Despite their common civil-
ian-protection feature, forcible R2P and r2p have never been linked before.
There is a sociological and a conceptual reason for the oversight. First, fans
of one concept tend to be critics of the other. R2P proponents are cosmo-
politans who believe that all people have fundamental human rights regard-
less of where they live. They believe that wealthy, militarily powerful states
have a responsibility to protect foreign civilians who are subject to mass
atrocities in their home states, even if it requires the use of armed force. r2p,
by contrast, is about a sovereign state’s unilateral use of armed force abroad
to protect its own citizens or the citizens of allied states. R2P seeks to make
sovereignty irrelevant; r2p celebrates it. Advocates of R2P thus typically
distinguish R2P from r2p,5 which they see as a tainted relic of the ancien
regime, not as a precedent for their cause in logic or law.
Second, when international lawyers do talk about r2p in an unconsenting
state, they almost always categorize it as a sub-species of self-defense which
4. See infra Part I.B. See generally Richard B. Lillich, Lillich on the Forcible Protection of
Nationals Abroad (Thomas C. Wingfield & James E. Meyen eds., 2002).
5. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 Amsterdam L. F. 25 (2009).
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may or may not be lawful as applied in a particular case.6 This automatic
assumption that any extraterritorial use of force to protect one’s nationals is
grounded in a self-defense claim is wrong.7 Thinking that such military
missions are necessarily done in self-defense is particularly dangerous at a
time when resurgent nationalism in great-power states and their diasporas
makes r2p a convenient legal justification for using armed force in contested
territories, most recently by Russia in Crimea and other parts of Ukraine in
2014.8 By contrast it seems more correct to conclude that military interven-
tions on behalf of endangered nationals far away from a state’s borders are
usually not self-defense, because their distant endangerment does not impli-
cate the territorial integrity or political independence of the state as pro-
tected under U.N. Charter Article 2(4), which is often read as a gloss on
Article 51’s preservation of “the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence.”9 An important exception to this conclusion is the extraterrito-
rial use of force to protect state officials (such as the attempt to rescue U.S.
embassy hostages in Tehran in 1980), property (such as a warship or em-
bassy), or instrumentalities (such as national-flagged passenger ships or air-
craft). These are more plausible instances of self-defense because the targets
attacked or threatened are organs (or quasi-organs) of the state, and attacks
on them are reasonably perceived as attacks on the state as a polity.10
Indeed, U.S. international lawyers of a prior generation commonly re-
ferred to the use of armed force to rescue civilian nationals overseas as “hu-
manitarian intervention,” not self-defense. For example, in 1973, Harvard
6. See, e.g., James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed.
2012); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th ed. 2005).
7. U.S. constitutional law scholar Henry Monaghan made a similar point about the constitutional
power of the U.S. President by asserting a unilateral power to use armed force to protect U.S. officials,
property, and instrumentalities, but questioning whether such a power extended to the protection of
civilian U.S. citizens abroad. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 71–72 (1993).
8. For example, Russia was reported to have distributed Russian passports to residents of South Os-
setia (then a contested part of Georgia) in order to supply a r2p legal basis for invasion in 2008. See
Damien McElroy, South Ossetian Police Tell Georgians to take a Russian Passport, or Leave their Homes, The
Telegraph (Aug. 30, 2008, 8:40 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/
2651836/South-Ossetian-police-tell-Georgians-to-take-a-Russian-passport-or-leave-their-homes.html. In
2014, Russia offered Russian passports to members of the Ukrainian riot police and considered measures
to ease the way for ethnic Russians and other Ukrainians to obtain Russian passports. See Peter Kenyon,
Russia May Expedite Passports for Ukraine’s Ethnic Russians, NPR.org (Mar. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://
www.npr.org/2014/03/06/286646521/russia-moves-to-expedite-passports-for-ethnic-russians-in-ukraine;
Ukraine Crisis: Russia Mulls New Land-Grab Law, BBC News (Feb. 28, 2014, 9:32 AM), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-26381454.
9. See Dinstein, supra note 6, at 177; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of R
Force 118 (2008).
10. That is not to say that the self-defense rationale is unlimited with respect to state persons or
property. For example, although Congress has authorized the U.S. President to use armed force to rescue
any American soldier held by the International Criminal Court, it would likely be a violation of interna-
tional law for the President to do so without prior resort to peaceful measures. See American Ser-
vicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. § 7427 (2002) (“The President is authorized to use all
means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release of any” U.S. servicemember or contractor
detained on behalf of the International Criminal Court.).
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Law School professor Richard Baxter defined humanitarian intervention pri-
marily in terms of r2p:
I assume that humanitarian intervention, for better or for worse, is
a short-term use of armed force by a government, in what would
otherwise be a violation of the sovereignty of a foreign State, for
the protection from death or grave injury of nationals of the act-
ing State—and incidentally, perhaps, nationals of other States—
by their removal from the territory of the foreign State. Now we
can talk about genocide, we can talk about Bangladesh, we can
talk about ICRC operations, and so forth, but this is presumably
the core meaning of this concept.11
Louis Henkin, who replaced Baxter as Chief Reporter of the Restatement
(Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, similarly observed that: “In princi-
ple, the right to intervene to save lives applies whether the endangered per-
sons are nationals of the intervening state, local citizens, or nationals of a
third country. In practice, states have claimed such rights of intervention
only on behalf of their own citizens.”12 Today, the words “humanitarian
intervention” are usually limited to R2P, or “the threat or use of force by a
state, group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose
of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of
internationally recognized human rights.”13
The conclusion that using armed force abroad to protect nationals is hu-
manitarian intervention and not self-defense is reinforced when one consid-
ers motives. An attack or imminent risk of attack on a very large number of
one’s nationals—for instance, a migrant-labor population numbering in the
hundreds of thousands, or millions—might be perceived as tantamount to
an attack on the homeland. But the decisionmakers of a state that uses mili-
tary force when a few hundred or thousands of nationals are at risk far away
typically act out of a sense that the state has a humanitarian “responsibility”
to rescue its citizens in harm’s way, just as they might feel a responsibility
to use the state’s military resources to rescue them from a deadly hurricane
or earthquake. That is very different from acting because of a perceived
threat to the state’s territorial integrity, political independence, or a general
need to defend the country. Moreover, this humanitarian motivation is not
11. Remarks of Richard R. Baxter, Conference Proceedings, Part II: The Present, in Humanitarian In-
tervention and the United Nations 53 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
12. Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. 293, 297 n.15 (1991); see Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v.
Might: International Law and the Use of Force 37, 41–42 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed.
1991).
13. Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving
World Order 11–12 (1996) (emphasis added); see Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals
Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity XIV-XV
(1985) (excluding military missions to protect nationals from the definition of humanitarian
intervention).
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so different in kind from a concern for the welfare of endangered civilians
who lack common nationality—a fact most evident when allegedly endan-
gered civilians in a foreign country share ethnic ties with the invaders, like
the ethnic Russians in Crimea.
Not only do R2P and r2p share an identity as forms of humanitarian
intervention, but both also fit uncomfortably into the conventional view of
the international law of permissible reasons for resort to armed force, which
relies heavily on the words of the U.N. Charter. The Charter explicitly per-
mits states to use armed force only “in individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”14 or pur-
suant to U.N. Security Council authorization of force “to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”15 The prevailing, textualist view among
international lawyers today—what I call the bifocal orthodoxy—denies any
role for custom in defining jus ad bellum and asserts instead that the two
grounds codified in the U.N. Charter are the only two lawful justifications
for war. As Vladimir Putin, a Russian adherent of the bifocal orthodoxy,
once put it: “Under current international law, force is permitted only in
self-defence or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is
unacceptable.”16 All other uses of armed force in international affairs, so it
goes, are prohibited by Article 2(4)’s command that “[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”17 For
this reason, many believe that a R2P intervention is lawful only with U.N.
Security Council authorization and that a lawful r2p intervention must fall
within the rubric of self-defense.
Despite the textualist and pacifist appeal of constraining jus ad bellum to
the two grounds enumerated in the U.N. Charter, the prescriptions of the
bifocal orthodoxy do not fit real life and are also normatively problematic.
As a descriptive matter, the military intervention of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) countries in Kosovo in 1999 was neither
preauthorized by the U.N. Security Council nor easily justifiable as self-
14. U.N. Charter art. 51. The self-defense right has a sunset provision: “until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to restore international peace and security.”
15. Id. art. 42.
16. Vladimir Putin, A Plea for Caution From Russia, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html.
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4. Invitation or the consent of a sovereign state is a third category of
legal justification (in addition to humanitarian intervention) that is not expressly codified in the U.N.
Charter. See Gray, supra note 9, at 67–113 (3d ed. 2008). It, too, has roots in basic U.N. Charter
principles, namely a sovereign state’s autonomy within its borders, art. 2 ¶ 7, and the principle of
sovereign equality, art. 2 ¶ 1. Furthermore, the U.N. Charter’s jus ad bellum prohibitions might plausi-
bly be construed to apply on their face to international conflicts only, which would not include foreign
interventions in civil wars at the invitation of a legitimate government. There is a cluster of issues
implicated by the doctrine of invitation, such as recognition—whether a rebel or secessionist group can
claim sovereignty or a government can claim it when it has lost effective control of territory or popula-
tion—and the principle of counter-intervention to balance out prior foreign interventions.
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defense because it occurred beyond the NATO countries’ borders and treaty
responsibilities. Accordingly, the majority of international lawyers have con-
cluded that Kosovo was “legitimate but unlawful,” in line with the bifocal
orthodoxy.18 Furthermore, there have been instances such as Rwanda in
1994, Darfur in 2003 to 2004, and Syria in 2012 to 2014, where mass
killings occurred or persisted because of U.N. Security Council inaction or
paralysis.
With regard to r2p, there have been multiple military interventions on
behalf of civilians abroad in the post-World War II era without U.N. Secur-
ity Council authorization—most famously the Israeli raid into Entebbe,
Uganda in 1976, the United States’ invasions of Grenada in 1982 and Pan-
ama in 1989, and Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia in 2008 and interven-
tion in Crimea in 2014. These cases have been reconciled with the bifocal
orthodoxy, first by generally classifying all r2p cases as a sub-species of self-
defense,19 and, second, by asserting that some invocations are lawful (for
example, Entebbe) and others are unlawful (for example, Grenada, Panama,
South Ossetia, and Crimea).20 But, as noted above, presuming that every
instance where a state uses force abroad to protect its nationals is a case of
self-defense—whether lawful or unlawful—defies the logic of the concept.
And yet, some cases where military force was used to protect civilian nation-
als at risk of group death in the target state have been viewed—and should
be viewed—as lawful, albeit under a different doctrinal rubric than self-
defense.
What is needed is a departure from the U.N. Charter-based bifocal ortho-
doxy, namely, the recognition of a third customary international law ground
for war under which the extraterritorial use of armed force to protect civil-
ians at imminent risk of group death is justified without U.N. Security
Council pre-approval or as self-defense. In the past, this customary category
of unilateral humanitarian intervention was limited to the use of armed force
to protect civilians of the intervening state (r2p) or of third countries, but,
since the late 1990s, with the advent of the R2P cluster of norms, it has
expanded to include the use of force to protect civilians of the target state.21
18. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 Am. J. Int’l L.
834, 834 (1999) (“Indisputably, the NATO intervention through its bombing campaign violated the
United Nations Charter and International Law.”); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian
Intervention,” 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 824, 826 (1999) (“In my view the law is, and ought to be, that unilat-
eral intervention by military force by a state or group of states is unlawful unless authorized by the
Security Council.”).
19. See, e.g., Dinstein, supra note 6, at 234  (“As an exercise of the right of self-defence, the protec- R
tion of nationals abroad must not be confused with ‘humanitarian intervention.’”); id. at n.79 (“The
present writer cannot accept the proposition advocated by, e.g., . . . Henkin . . . that a so-called Entebbe
principle—as a legitimate form of humanitarian intervention—constitutes an exception to the general
prohibition of the use of inter-State armed force pursuant to Article 2(4) of the Charter, irrespective of
the provision of Article 51.”).
20. See, e.g., Henkin, The Invasion of Panama under International Law: A Gross Violation, supra note 12, at R
296–97.
21. See infra Figure 1.
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The category encompasses cases where a use-of-force easement is implied at
law within the territory of an unconsenting sovereign state where civilians
face an imminent risk of group extermination. In traditional r2p cases, the
relevant group facing death consists of foreign nationals; in R2P cases, the
group comprises local noncombatants or civilians. The specific customary
rule, distilled from r2p state practice and commentary, has the same threat,
proportionality, and exhaustion elements shared by all jus ad bellum,
namely that the military expedition within the territory of an unconsenting
foreign state is: (1) mounted to protect civilians facing imminent risk of
group extermination sponsored or sanctioned by the target state; (2) nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the specific goal of preventing such an atrocity; and
(3) all other reasonable means have been exhausted.22 “Group extermina-
tion” means not only genocide (that is, the extinction of an affinity group
typically defined by race, religion, or ethnicity) but also mass killings where
the state directs or knowingly permits the simultaneous deaths of a “group”
(in the sense of a large number, for example, a hundred or more) of unarmed
human beings without a colorable law enforcement or national security ob-
jective. Massacres of a large group of unarmed and restrained civilians, or the
use of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons in heavily civilian-populated
areas are notable examples. Military interventions to address mass atrocities
or international law violations that do not involve group extermination,
such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, the possession of weapons of mass de-
struction, non-lethal crimes against humanity, and lethal crimes against hu-
manity short of massacres, would still require U.N. Security Council
authorization, consent, or a valid self-defense justification.
22. Cf. U.N. Charter ch. VII (setting forth a sequence for U.N. Security Council authorization of force
that requires: (1) a determination “of the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression,” art. 39; (2) provides for provisional measures and “measures not involving the use of
force,” arts. 40 & 41; and (3) use of force as “necessary” if peaceful measures “would be inadequate or
have proved to be inadequate,” art. 42).
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Figure 1: Three Categories of Lawful Use of Force to Protect
Persons Abroad
intervention
to protect
civilians without
U.N. Security
Council
pre-approval,
invitation, or
self-defense
justification
R2P
intervention with
U.N. Security Council
pre-approval
r2p
intervention in self-defense
against attacks or imminent
attacks on a state’s officials,
soldiers, properties, or
instrumentalities
Integrating R2P and r2p into a unitary concept of a customary jus ad
bellum to protect civilians has doctrinal and methodological benefits. Doc-
trinally, integration clarifies the notoriously opaque customary international
law of reasons for going to war and articulates a highly constrained—and
thus normatively appealing—customary law rider to the textualist bifocal
orthodoxy. Integration suggests that U.N. Security Council preauthorization
is not always necessary for R2P and that a sovereign state may not unilater-
ally launch an r2p intervention based on its own subjective assessment of
danger to its civilian nationals. In so doing, doctrinal integration sharpens
the international legal analysis of cases like Syria and Crimea.
Methodologically, integration gives an example of how to cut a middle
path in public international law between globalists who prefer top-down
norm formation like R2P and sovereigntists who prefer bottom-up norm
formation like r2p by logging the practices common to all or nearly all
states, particularly the most powerful ones. In so doing, this Article at-
tempts to bridge the gap between the cosmopolitan vision of R2P and the
practical difficulty of implementing that vision in a world in which sover-
eignty remains the basic building block of international life and there is
great disparity in the relative military power of sovereign states.
This Article has four parts. Part I summarizes the current state of debate
about the international law of grounds for war or jus ad bellum. Part II
traces the ancient roots and modern evolution of the right of the state under
customary international law to use armed force in an unconsenting state to
protect its civilians “(r2p)”. Until the 1970s, international lawyers com-
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monly referred to such uses of force as humanitarian interventions. Part III
describes the late twentieth-century origins and subsequent development of
the Responsibility to Protect civilians (“R2P”)—a more cosmopolitan form
of humanitarian intervention that included a forcible component. Part IV—
the normative part—explains the homology of unilateral r2p and forcible
R2P interventions, how they may be distinguished from self-defense and
U.N. Security Council authorized uses of force, respectively, and proposes
that the two should be understood as forming one customary international
law doctrine of jus ad bellum in addition to the two grounds for war ex-
pressly enumerated in the U.N. Charter.
I. Jus ad bellum Today: The U.N. Charter Regime
When does international law permit one or more states to use armed force
within the territory of another sovereign state without its consent? The
question persists despite the world community’s efforts to restrict the inter-
national use of armed force after the devastation of the twentieth century’s
two world wars. The international law dimension of the campaign to end
war is codified in the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”23 For
the first four decades of the life of the U.N. Charter, decolonization and the
Cold War spawned armed conflicts that were often legally justified by nar-
row constructions of what constituted a “threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”24
But, in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, most international
lawyers stopped hypertextual parsing of Article 2(4) and coalesced around
the view that the only two lawful uses of force in the territory of an uncon-
senting sovereign state were enumerated elsewhere in the U.N. Charter.
First, Article 42 specifies that the U.N. Security Council “may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.”25 Second, Article 51 provides: “Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
23. U.N. Charter art. 2  ¶ 4.
24. Id. (emphasis added). See generally, e.g., Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law’s Empire: The Jurispru-
dence War, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 117 (1991); Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 Am. J. Int’l
L. 809 (1970); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 Am. J.
Int’l L. 544 (1971); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antimonies, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 860 (1999); W.
Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 642
(1984); Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 Am. J. Int’l L. 645 (1984).
25. U.N. Charter art. 42.
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Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security.”26
From a normative standpoint, this bifocal orthodoxy of jus ad bellum has
much to commend to it and commands great approval among international
lawyers and non-experts alike. First, given the destructive nature of war, it is
comforting to believe that international law now only recognizes two reasons
for war. Moreover, one of the two reasons, self-defense, is logically restricted
to the use of force to defend the same “territorial integrity” and “political
independence” referenced in Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force.
Threats to a state’s “political independence” or “territorial integrity” are
only rarely posed by events or conditions far away from its own territory.27
Thus, the self-defense justification is largely limited to uses of force within
or near the territory of the sovereign state (or states) using armed force.
Additionally, Article 51’s specification of the “inherent” right of self-de-
fense articulates two other significant limitations: a trigger—“if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”—and a sunset pro-
vision—“until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security.”28
Second, the bifocal orthodoxy diminishes the possibility that the most
powerful states (the United States being the most militarily powerful by a
vast margin today) can wage unilateral wars in distant places without the
brake effect of international illegality. Powerful states are more likely than
weak states to have national interests beyond their borders. A state with
military power in excess of what is reasonably necessary to defend its terri-
tory may seek to use it extraterritorially to advance its national interests.
The bifocal orthodoxy of jus ad bellum requires a militarily powerful state to
frame any international law case for using armed force extraterritorially in
terms of host-state consent, self-defense, or U.N. Security Council authoriza-
tion. The rationales of consent and self-defense may seem ambiguous and
prone to pretextual invocations, but they also have logical limits. Consent
requires a functioning regime in the target state with a plausible claim to
sovereign recognition. Self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, as
noted above, requires colorable assertions of an “armed attack” and a threat
to the intervening state’s “territorial integrity” or “political indepen-
dence.”29 The most powerful states will not perceive the reduction of the
reasons for war to two as a benefit, as the reduction drastically limits their
26. Id. art. 51.
27. Three notable exceptions are: (1) the September, 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States
which were launched by a group that had base areas and training camps in Afghanistan; (2) the 1976
hijacking of an Air France flight with a majority of Israeli passengers by pro-Palestinian terrorists who
were allowed to land in Entebbe, Uganda; and (3) the distant presence of weapons of mass destruction
that are easily transportable and which the intervening state reasonably fears may be used against it.
28. U.N. Charter art. 51.
29. Or the imminent risk of an armed attack, which has been broadly accepted to authorize some
measure of preemptive self-defense.
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freedom of action. But it is still a reason for the people of every other sover-
eign state (190 or so today) to prefer a two-pronged jus ad bellum.
Proponents of the bifocal orthodoxy would do well to remember that the
other, U.N. Charter-codified use of force—U.N. Security Council authoriza-
tion—is a special accommodation of the five most powerful states on the
winning side of the Second World War. U.N. Security Council voting rules
mean that armed force will likely be lawful when approved or permitted by
the five countries that are permanent members of the Council (the “P5”)—
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.30 Five
votes for war are much more difficult to get than one,31 particularly when
the political, strategic, and military interests of the second- and third-
strongest permanent members are opposed to those of its most powerful
permanent member and its fourth- and fifth-ranked allies. Thus, the current
balance of power internal to the U.N. Security Council seems particularly
effective in curtailing resort to this prong of the jus ad bellum as a legal
basis for war. At the same time, the normative basis of this reason for lawful
war seems inferior to self-defense because it is both rooted in an anachronis-
tic snapshot of the world balance of power and also hostage to the national-
interest calculations of the five permanent members.
The third reason for the popularity of the bifocal orthodoxy is a prevailing
jurisprudential mindset in favor of written documents over unwritten cus-
toms as the principal source of law. In international law, this textualist
mindset manifests itself in an emphasis on treaty law, particularly multilat-
eral treaties like the U.N. Charter itself, which have proliferated exponen-
tially and into new subject areas. Before the twentieth century, international
customs, or customary international law—the “general and consistent prac-
tice[s] of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation” (or opinio
juris)32—constituted the largest and prime source of international laws.33
Thus, the two most important sorts of references for ascertaining interna-
tional law rules were: (1) treatises by respected writers like Hugo Grotius
(seventeenth century), Emmerich de Vattel (eighteenth century), and Henry
Wheaton (nineteenth century), which drew out general principles from
sweeping surveys of state practice; and (2) comprehensive digests of state
30. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3 (“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members.”) (emphasis
added).
31. In the case of the United States, the decision to use armed force is further constrained by a
domestic constitutional order formed at a time of national weakness to make it hard for the national
government to use armed force outside of the United States except defensively in cases of invasion or
rebellion. See Thomas H. Lee, The Tobacco Republic (manuscript on file with author).
32. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986).
33. The point was well put by a canonical international law treatise in 1963: “The best view is that
international law is in fact just a system of customary law, upon which has been erected, almost entirely
within the last two generations, a superstructure of ‘conventional’ or treaty-made law, and some of its
chief defects are precisely those that the history of law teaches us to expect in a customary system.” J. L.
Brierley, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace 71
(Humphrey Waldock, 6th ed. 1963).
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practice, such as the American John B. Moore’s A Digest of International Law,
compiled in eight volumes and published by the U.S. State Department in
1906. Today, treaty provisions can be looked up online and read instantly.
By contrast, ascertaining customary international law rules requires an ency-
clopedic knowledge of state practice, sometimes as much as hundreds of
instances. Furthermore, it has become much more difficult to identify con-
sensus today because international law’s coverage has expanded in terms of
subject matter and the number and diversity of sovereign states whose prac-
tices comprise the grist of custom. The upshot is that contemporary interna-
tional lawyers tend to downplay or neglect customary international law rules
in many areas, including jus ad bellum. And when they do refer to custom-
ary rules, it is most commonly by reference to written documents such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or provisions in treaties that a par-
ticular state has not ratified but which are argued to be binding by way of
custom.34
It is unsurprising, then, that today’s international lawyers forget that
before the twentieth century, customary law alone was the source of jus ad
bellum. The ancien regime, formed by the practice of states in belligerent
times, was as permissive as the U.N. Charter regime is now restrictive. One
of the most capacious lawful reasons for the use of armed force in interna-
tional affairs was to prevent or redress injury to one’s people in a foreign
country.35 As the global economy, assisted by the technology of travel, grew
more interdependent, the nationals of the most powerful states spread
throughout the world. Their presence in foreign lands presented not just
opportunities for trade and commerce that might accrue to the wealth of a
nation, but also convenient hooks to ground legal justifications for war in
the event of alleged ill-treatment. Unsurprisingly, civilian protection be-
came a preeminent reason given for war before the First World War.
34. A good example of this is the typical method of proof in U.S. federal courts for customary interna-
tional law violations in litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (plaintiff pleading a violation of customary international law “traces the rule
against arbitrary arrest not only to the Declaration [of Human Rights], but also to article nine of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . to which the United States is a party, and to
various other conventions to which it is not”).
35. Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of
International Claims 448 (1915) (“The army or navy has frequently been used for the protection of
citizens or their property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the local government has
failed, through inability or unwillingness to afford adequate protection to the persons or property of the
foreigners in question.”).
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II. The Customary International Law Right to Protect One’s
Civilians (“r2p”)
A. Origins and Evolution of r2p
Understanding the importance in international law of the right to use
armed force to protect one’s nationals abroad requires a brief overview of the
origins of the sovereign state and the project of modern international law.
The primary aim of leading eighteenth- and nineteenth-century interna-
tional lawyers such as Emmerich de Vattel and Henry Wheaton was essen-
tially English political theorist John Locke’s project on the international
level. Locke theorized private property over which an individual had exclu-
sive domain as the basic building block of a successful domestic polity. Ac-
cordingly, the best domestic legal order was one that recognized and
reinforced this fundamental rule. Similarly, it was the sovereign state’s enti-
tlement to exclusive use and rule within its own territory—analogous to the
individual’s exclusive use of his or her property—that was the key to a suc-
cessful international political system. And so the best international legal or-
der was one that maintained the exclusive autonomy of the nation-state—
not the human beings who constituted it—as the basic and irreducible unit
of the world community.36 This fixation on exclusive sovereignty was espe-
cially attractive and vital to militarily weak republics that had broken from
powerful monarchic states, like the Dutch and Swiss republics in Europe,
the United States in the eighteenth century, and the Latin American repub-
lics of the nineteenth century.37 A doctrine of indefeasible exclusive sover-
eignty within one’s territory was a powerful argument for non-intervention
by former imperial states in the domestic affairs of liberated colonies.
But the dogma of exclusive rule within borders reinforced an enduring
dilemma: if each sovereign state was autonomous and numinous within its
territory, how could another sovereign state guarantee the safety of its peo-
ple who might travel there? A crucial goal of early modern international law
was to solve this centuries-old problem exacerbated by the principle of ex-
clusive sovereignty.38 Thus, leading jurists like Hugo Grotius emphasized
the ancient roots of the rule to do no violence to strangers who have come to
one’s land in peace.39 The failure to honor the rule was the very definition of
36. See generally Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (A.P. Martinich ed., 2002); Stephen Krasner, Sov-
ereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999). For a recent effort to revise the inward-looking telos of the
sovereign state, see Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to
Foreign Stakeholders, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 296 (2013).
37. See Thomas H. Lee, International Law, International Relations Theory, and Preemptive War: The Vitality
of Sovereign Equality Today, 64 L. & Contemp. Probs. 147 (2004).
38. The definitive work on the topic is former Yale Law School professor Edwin Borchard’s The
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims (1915). See Borchard,
supra note 35. R
39. See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace 446 (Jean Barbeyrac & Richard Tuck eds.,
2005) (Bk. II, Ch. II) (1625); see also Samuel Pufendorf, On the Laws of Nature and of Nations
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uncivilized conduct, of barbarism.40 In the late medieval and modern peri-
ods, European states and their progeny developed an elaborate regime for the
protection of the persons and properties of peaceful aliens—called “safe con-
ducts”—which formed the touchstone of the classical international legal or-
der in place from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century.41 By
formulating a framework that ensured credible protection of merchants
across borders, international law nurtured international commerce and
peaceful relations, increasing the welfare of all humankind.
The ultimate means by which a state could redress (and deter) the failure
of another host state to honor its responsibility to protect its nationals was
to wage war on it. The law-of-nations writers of the period generally pre-
ferred peaceful means such as diplomacy or arbitration, but there was no
customary rule requiring states to use such means first or exclusively.42
Thus, early modern international law recognized the right of a sovereign to
use armed force to protect its civilians in a foreign state. In fact, according to
Grotius, the idea that a polity was justified in using armed force for the
protection of its people in distant lands was older, even, than classical
antiquity:
Our Ancestors, says Cicero to the Romans, often commenced a
War, if but one of their Merchants and Mariners had been ill dealt
with: And in another Passage, How many Wars, (says he) have
our Fathers engaged in, upon their hearing that any Roman Citi-
zens have been injured, . . . . The same Romans, tho’ they refused
to take up Arms in behalf of their Allies, did yet, as soon as ever
(George Carew & Jean Barbeyrac eds., 2005) (Bk. III, Ch. III) (1729) (“Among the duties of humanity
. . . is that of admitting strangers.”). Grotius asserted that the law of nations gave aliens the right to stay
for a short time in a foreign country for innocent reasons like their health (for example, shipwrecked
sailors), see Grotius, supra, at 446, and even that “a fixed Abode ought not to be refused to Strangers,
who being expelled [by] their own Country, seek a Retreat elsewhere.” Id. at 447. He was writing at an
early point in the rise of exclusive sovereignty as the dominant ordering principle of the world system. By
the mid- to late-eighteenth century as the dogma of exclusive sovereignty reached apogee, international
law publicists, most notably Emmerich de Vattel, asserted that a sovereign had a near-absolute right to
exclude aliens subject only to a narrowed emergency exception. See Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of
Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Na-
tions and Sovereigns (Joseph Chitty ed., 2005) (1758) (“Emer de Vattel” according to some sources
and editions). To counterbalance this, he and other writers such as the Englishman William Blackstone
theorized a broad range of ways a sovereign had expressly or impliedly consented to the admission of
peaceful aliens under the concept of the “safe conduct”—a sovereign at peace with another sovereign was
viewed as having granted the other’s subjects a promise to protect their persons and properties within its
borders so long as the aliens submitted to the host sovereign’s laws. William Blackstone, Commen-
taries on the Law of England 68–69 (photo. reprint 1983) (1769).
40. See Grotius, supra note 39, at 447 (Bk. II, Ch. II). R
41. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 880–82
(2006).
42. See Borchard, supra note 35, at 439–56. Specifically, “[h]aving become a matter for interna- R
tional adjustment, the person injured has no control over the measure of redress to be demanded or the
means to be employed, matters entirely within the discretion and control of the government.” Id. at 439.
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those Allies had thrown themselves under their Protection, and so
became their Subjects, think themselves obligated to do it.43
A troublesome consequence of recognizing a robust legal right to use
armed force against a host state that failed to live up to its responsibility to
protect aliens was the potential for pretextual invocation. Cicero’s remark
about how Rome would not take up arms to protect allies but would when
those allies “became their Subjects” suggests the role of power calculations
in decisions to use force to protect subjects abroad. Other people knew that
if they submitted to Rome, they would get Rome’s protection. And those
who contemplated violence to Romans abroad were taught the lesson of Ro-
man power even at great distances from Rome.
Even in the modern era, injury or the threat of injury to a citizen was a
common legal ground for war until the middle decades of the twentieth
century that often masked deeper political calculations behind the use of
force. A merchant, a settler, or a missionary would be attacked or otherwise
suffer injury to their persons or property in a foreign country. The mother
country would demand compensation on behalf of its aggrieved subject or
subjects from the foreign sovereign or perhaps some other suitable repara-
tions. When no compensation was proffered or what was proffered was
deemed inadequate, the home sovereign could decide whether to wage war
on the foreign sovereign, do nothing, or take some intermediate measure
like cutting off trade or credit. This basic scenario transpired not only be-
tween Western European powers and the rest of the world but also between
European powers. As international exchange thickened, so did the scrapes
and bruises to foreigners in strange lands. As a result, r2p became a handy
hook on which to hang a casus belli (a case for war), even when the real reason
for war may have been unrelated to the specific injury to the person or
property of its subject that the home sovereign pleaded. The r2p rationale
was also a very useful tool for stirring up domestic political support and
popular sentiment in favor of a foreign war.  Consequently, r2p was a ubiq-
uitous ground for war before the last century.
As a general matter, the law of war before the mid-twentieth century was
markedly different from the current U.N. Charter-based jus ad bellum de-
scribed in Part I. The use-of-armed-force rules in the Charter reflect the
culmination of a trend toward restrictive regulation of the resort to armed
force in international relations that started in the early twentieth century.
The goal was to shrink as much as possible the set of permissible legal
justifications for war and other armed encounters between sovereign states.
The aim was a return to the past—that is, to the earlier just-war tradition of
medieval and early modern Christian writers who had sought to identify and
cabin a set of morally legitimate (and thus lawful, in their view—an equa-
43. Grotius, supra note 39, at 115–52 (Bk. II, Ch. XXV). R
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tion of morality and legality considered more suspect today44) reasons to go
to war.45 The period in between—most notably the seventeenth century up
to the First World War—was one in which armed force was generally
viewed as lawful; national leaders and international lawyers saw a sovereign
state’s use of armed force up to and including declared war as an upper band
of sanctions in a spectrum of acceptable political tools to vindicate its na-
tional interests.46
Pre-World War II international law generally did not have anything to
say about how a state acted within its borders, which was viewed as a matter
of internal governance protected by the bedrock principle of exclusive sover-
eignty. This included the basic human rights of the state’s native citizens.
But the property-like rule of a sovereign state’s right to exclude was sub-
ject to exceptions independent of the sovereign’s consent—easements so to
speak, to build on the property law analogy. Two of these easements impli-
cated armed force. First, there was the right of innocent passage;47 a sover-
eign could not deny a reasonable request by a fellow sovereign whose army
or warship had to either pass through its territorial lands and waters to get
somewhere else, or else was forced to take refuge there or in its territorial
waters, for example, because of a bad storm at sea.48 Second, and more rele-
vant, there was r2p—the idea that another sovereign could use force to pro-
tect the property or persons of nationals, usually merchants, reasonably
perceived to be at risk in a foreign land because the foreign sovereign was
incapable, unwilling, or hostile.49 In the nineteenth century, the right to
protect one’s nationals was often built into larger so-called “unequal trea-
ties” which ceded wholesale extraterritorial rights to Western powers. But
even absent such a treaty, a robust r2p right to use force to protect the
persons and property of nationals was fully recognized as international law
by way of custom.
The twentieth-century trend toward reducing the lawful reasons to go to
war scaled back the right to protect, most significantly by eliminating it
with respect to the use of force to protect against or vindicate past injury to
44. Although less so in the law of war, see, for example, Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars:
A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (2006).
45. See, e.g., Leslie C. Green, Essays on the Modern Law of War (1999); Richard Tuck, The
Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius
to Kant (2000). See generally, Dinstein, supra note 6; Gray, supra note 9. R
46. Thus Von Clausewitz’s famous maxim, “war is merely the continuation of policy by other
means,” was an accurate statement of the contemporaneous norms on the law of war. See Carl Von
Clausewitz, On War 87 (Colonel J.J. Graham trans. 2008) (1832).
47. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
48. See, e.g., The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). Technically, innocent passage
might not be viewed as an exception per se, since the sword stays sheathed during transit or refuge. But a
foreign army or warship within one’s territory was a dangerous thing, and it was a significant act of trust
which international law sought to enable to accept that the requesting sovereign’s intentions were en-
tirely peaceful, and not a ruse or reconnaissance in advance of invasion.
49. See Edwin Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1907); John Bassett
Moore, International Law Digest (1906).
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the property interests of an intervening sovereign’s nationals. The first such
r2p curtailment initiative, indeed, the first modern constraint on jus ad bel-
lum by multilateral treaty, was the 1907 Convention Respecting the Limi-
tation of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts negotiated at the second
Hague Conference (the “1907 Hague Convention”).50 The historical record
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been studded with mili-
tary interventions by the European powers in rest-of-the-world sovereign
states, ostensibly for the protection of the property interests of their nation-
als. Attitudes toward this trend began to change near the turn of the century
under American leadership. The specific impetus for the 1907 Hague Con-
vention had been a joint British-German naval bombardment of Venezuela
for failure to pay up on bonds held by British and German private banks.
The Convention provided that “the Contracting Powers agree not to have
recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the
Government of one country by the Government of another country as being
due to its nationals.”51
Although there was no exact analogue to the 1907 Hague Convention on
Contract Debts with regard to nationals’ property-law interests in a foreign
state (that is, protections against expropriation or exercises of eminent do-
main), customary international law evolved to prohibit that type of r2p too.
Since foreign-owned property was still property within the territory of the
host sovereign state, it would seem that r2p for property interests was fore-
closed by the explicit operation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter: “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity . . . of any state.”52 But it was the
subsequent failed United Kingdom-France-Israel intervention in the Suez
Crisis of 1956 that marked the actual death knell for the idea that armed
force could be used to protect against injury to the purely economic interests
of one’s nationals, whether grounded in contract law or property law. When
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, there
was a plausible argument that its treaty-protected status as an international
waterway meant that a foreign military intervention to preserve the status
did not breach Egypt’s “territorial integrity” or “political independence” as
protected by Article 2(4).53 Regardless, the world community, led by the
United States, ultimately rejected the validity of the use of armed force to
protect the property interests of foreign nationals, and there has been no
50. Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract
Debts, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, U.N.T.S. 537.
51. Id. art. 1. The provision further states that: “This undertaking is, however, not applicable when
the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after accepting the offer,
prevents any compromis [agreement to arbitrate] from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to
submit to the award.” Id. However, customary international law gradually extended beyond the literal
terms of the treaty to prohibit the use of force to protect the contract interests of nationals even if the
debtor state refused to arbitrate.
52. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
53. See Tarek Osman, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak (2011).
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subsequent notable attempt to invoke it again. If r2p did not justify the use
of force with respect to a public-good property interest like the Suez Canal,
it is hard to see where it might have any traction at all in the realm of
economic, as opposed to bodily, interests.
Despite the transformative evolution of the world community and its laws
since the Second World War, the core human-protection aspect of r2p ap-
pears alive and well, unlike the protection of nationals’ property. Two theo-
retical points are worth noting before discussing the cases. First, r2p is a
luxury that only powerful states need and can afford. The state contemplat-
ing its use must have nationals flung across all parts of the world and the
raw military power to exercise armed force in those places.54 Second, the
world is a generally safer place for aliens than it was during the heyday of
r2p. The safety of one’s nationals in most parts of the world is assured by
diplomatic relations without the need for the threat of armed force in the
event that a citizen is harmed. By the same token, civilians who end up in
some corner of the world where there is an imminent risk of harm likely put
themselves there having understood (and therefore arguably assumed) the
risk that they were going to a dangerous place. The upshot of the greater
level of safety around the world is that it is questionable whether r2p is still
needed to guarantee the safety of people traveling outside of their own coun-
try. And the upshot of the fact that people are generally on notice of where
there is danger in the world is doubt about whether a state still has a hu-
manitarian responsibility to protect its nationals facing an imminent risk of
group death, even if it has the right to use armed force to do so, if those
nationals knew or should have known that they were putting themselves in
harm’s way but went there anyway. Both points are worth keeping in mind
as we survey the modern landscape of the customary right to use armed force
extraterritorially to protect one’s own civilians.
B. The Contemporary Understanding of r2p
The r2p case study par excellence is the 1976 intervention by Israeli com-
mandoes in Entebbe, Uganda. The facts are well-known. Pro-Palestinian ter-
rorists hijacked an Air France flight from Tel Aviv after a stop-over in
Athens, Greece. The hijackers flew the plane to Entebbe, Uganda, where
they received a warm reception from Idi Amin, the infamous military
54. Dick Baxter put it this way in 1973:
I am reminded of the two ladies in Newport who met in the morning, and one said to the
other, ‘I thought one was not supposed to wear diamonds in the morning.’ And the lady who
was wearing the diamonds said, ‘I thought so too—until I had them.’ The fact is that there are
very few powers in the world today who have these diamonds, that is to say, large numbers of
nationals abroad and the naval and aerial capacity for mounting an operation to remove these
endangered nationals from foreign territories. I venture to say that if Bolivia or Bahrain had
this potential, it would make use of it.
Baxter, supra note 11, at 53. R
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strongman who then ruled the country. Many of the non-Israeli hostages
were released; it is debated whether those who continued to be held as hos-
tages were singled out because of their Israeli nationality or because they
were Jewish. The terrorists held on to 106 hostages in total, approximately
twenty of whom were Air France pilots and crew members who volunteered
to stay behind.
Negotiations were attempted with the mediation of Egypt but ultimately
broke down. The terrorists threatened to kill the hostages unless Israel and
other Western European countries released certain prisoners. Israel launched
a daring raid with the assistance of the Kenyan government that supplied
intelligence and granted armed overflight and refueling rights to the Israeli
force.55 The Israeli soldiers succeeded in rescuing 102 of the hostages, kill-
ing all the terrorists and about 40 Ugandan soldiers in the process. They also
destroyed several Ugandan fighter aircrafts at Entebbe Airport to preclude
aerial pursuit after the Israeli force took off for home.
The world community’s reaction to the Entebbe Raid was mixed. U.N.
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim condemned the raid as “a serious viola-
tion of the national sovereignty of a United Nations member state.”56
China, the Soviet Union, India, and most of the U.N. members from Africa,
the Middle East, and the Communist bloc also condemned the raid as a
blatant violation of Uganda’s territorial sovereignty. The U.N. Security
Council, however, took no action due to the support of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France for Israel. Israel and its allies justified the
operation as an act of self-defense.57 The statement of the Israeli ambassador
to the United Nations also sounded a humanitarian theme:
We come with a simple message to the Council: We are proud of
what we have done because we have demonstrated to the world
that . . . the dignity of man, human life and human freedom
constitute the highest values. We are proud not only because we
have saved the lives of over a hundred innocent people—men,
women and children—but because of the significance of our act
for the cause of human freedom.58
As for international legal opinion today, there is consensus that Israel
acted lawfully in undertaking the Entebbe raid despite the blatant violation
of Uganda’s territorial sovereignty. Most international lawyers continue to
justify it as self-defense. The unique circumstances of Israel’s founding, the
Holocaust, and the then-recent murder of Israeli hostages at the 1972 Mu-
55. In retaliation, Idi Amin ordered the massacre of hundreds of Kenyans in Uganda and sent a hit
team that assassinated the Kenyan minister (and British intelligence officer) who helped to secure Ke-
nya’s support of the Israeli mission.
56. U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1939th mtg. at ¶¶ 13–14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939 (1976).
57. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 439, 453–54
(2000).
58. Chaim Herzog, Heroes of Israel 284 (1989).
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nich Olympics all added up to a strong case that taking military action in
Entebbe was essential to Israel’s “political independence” and therefore con-
stituted an act of self-defense. These factors are highly unlikely to be present
in other r2p cases conducted by countries that do not have Israel’s special
history. Moreover, even as applied to Israel, it is a stretch of the self-defense
logic to apply it to justify the use of force in a distant country like Uganda
that posed no direct threat to Israel. Thus, some international lawyers like
Lou Henkin focused on the humanitarian aspect of the mission and sug-
gested that the Entebbe principle was a freestanding exception to the U.N.
Charter’s Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of armed force.59 That position
drew fire from adherents to the majority view, including the Israeli law-of-
war scholar Yoram Dinstein. He could not “accept the proposition advo-
cated by . . . Henkin . . . that a so-called Entebbe principle—as a legitimate
form of humanitarian intervention—constitutes an exception to the general
prohibition of the use of inter-state armed force pursuant to Article 2(4) of
the Charter, irrespective of the provision of Article 51.”60
Notwithstanding this clash of legal titans about whether r2p as it was
applied at Entebbe was a sub-species of the Article 51 self-defense right or a
separate rule of customary law, there is general agreement on the content of
the rule. The rule’s three elements—necessity or imminent risk, proportion-
ality, and exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, are common to the two other
jus ad bellum codified in the U.N. Charter.61 For example, Article 42,
which is the provision granting the U.N. Security Council the power to
authorize the use of armed force, also has a peaceful-measures exhaustion
term. It authorizes the U.N. Security Council to use force when measures
specified in Article 41 “not involving the use of armed force”62 are “inade-
quate or have proved to be inadequate.”63  As for the other two elements—
necessity and proportionality—they are not only implicit in the U.N. Char-
ter’s specification of U.N. Security Council force authorizations, they are
also a “part of the basic core of self-defence.”64 Thus, as applied to Entebbe,
it was lawful to use armed force in an unconsenting foreign state: (1) to
protect civilians facing imminent risk of group death; (2) when the use of
force was narrowly tailored to protect the civilians; and (3) when all other
reasonable means have been exhausted, including diplomatic negotiations
for release of the hostages.65 Also possibly relevant to an analysis of the le-
gality of the r2p intervention was the fact that the hostages at Entebbe were
59. See Henkin, The Invasion of Panama under International Law: A Gross Violation, supra note 12, at R
296–97; Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might: International Law and the
Use of Force, supra note 12, at 56. R
60. Dinstein, supra note 6, at 234 n.79. R
61. See supra note 22. R
62. U.N. Charter art. 41.
63. Id. art. 42.
64. Gray, supra note 9, at 148. R
65. See Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations 453–54 (7th ed. 2012) (quoting John
Dugard, Int’l Law Comm’n, 52nd Sess., May 1-June 9, July 10-Aug. 18, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506
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brought to a foreign state involuntarily, a fact that is unlikely to recur in
most cases.
The Israeli operation in Entebbe may have been the most spectacular in-
stance of r2p in the modern era, but the United States has used the doctrine
the most in recent decades, although Russia has been more active of late.
This is unsurprising since the United States has been the dominant eco-
nomic and military power in the postwar period.66 Consequently, it has not
only had large numbers of its nationals abroad, but has also had the military
capacity to project power effectively into foreign countries. President Lyn-
don Johnson sent troops to protect American lives in the Dominican Repub-
lic in 1965. President Jimmy Carter used r2p to justify the failed military
attempt to rescue U.S. hostages seized by Iranian revolutionaries in the take-
over of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1980. President Ronald Reagan’s
1983 invasion of Grenada was justified in part by what may be the most
aggressive articulation of a U.S. civilian-protection mission, with respect to
U.S. medical school students believed to be at risk given political turmoil in
the country.67 And the protection of American nationals and property was
part of the justification for the invasion of Panama by President George
H.W. Bush in 1989.68 Bush also sent American military forces into Liberia
with authorization to fire in order to evacuate U.S. citizens in 1990.69 Other
countries have also exercised the right to protect their nationals: Belgium
intervening in the Congo in 1964 with the United States, and France in the
Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia in 2002 to 2003 and Chad
in 2006.
Russia has invoked the right to protect its nationals, as well as ethnic
Russians, as a ground for military interventions in South Ossetia in 2008
and most recently in Crimea in 2014. In February 2014, following months
of increasingly violent political protests in Ukraine, the pro-Russian presi-
dent Viktor Yanukovych hastily fled to Russia chastened by disclosures of
his opulent lifestyle and corruption.70 The Ukrainian parliament subse-
quently ousted him and installed a new pro-Western government.71 Shortly
thereafter, unmarked soldiers lacking insignia but using vehicles with Rus-
sian license plates entered southern Ukrainian territory in the Crimean pe-
ninsula near the Black Sea. They encircled government buildings and
(2000)). This part of Dugard’s report was a proposed draft article for conditions for lawful interventions
that was never ratified. Id.
66. See Lillich, supra note 4. R
67. See Ronald H. Cole, Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada,
12 October – 2 November 1983, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/urgfury.pdf.
68. See Henkin, supra note 12. R
69. Ann Devroy & Molly Moore, 61 Americans Evacuated from Liberia, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 1990),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/28/AR2006072800568.html.
70. Alison Smale & Steven Erlanger, Ukraine Mobilizes Reserve Troops, Threatening War, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine.html?hp&_r=1.
71. Id.
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military bases, occupied the region’s airports, and seized communication
hubs.72
Russia offered three legal arguments justifying the military intervention
in Ukrainian sovereign territory. First, they argued r2p, extending the basic
rationale not just to those alleged to have Russian nationality but also to
ethnic Russians who spoke the language.73 As a matter of domestic law, the
Russian parliament granted President Vladimir Putin authority to use force
to protect Russian citizens and soldiers throughout Ukraine who were
threatened by violence.74 Second, Putin argued consent through invitation
by ex-President Yanukovych and Crimea’s pro-Russian Prime Minister.75
Russia asserted that Yanukovych’s overthrow was an unconstitutional coup,
and, accordingly, that he had the sovereign authority to give consent to
Russia’s intervention.76 The Russians also claimed that they were invited
into the Ukrainian district of Crimea by local officials who represented the
popular will of the people of the region (primarily ethnic Russians) in re-
jecting the legitimacy of Ukraine’s new government and in seeking secession
and possible reunification with Russia.77 Third, the Russian government in-
voked a self-defense rationale based on allegations of some 675,000 Ukrain-
ian refugees entering Russia and constituting a “humanitarian
catastrophe.”78
The Russian military intervention into Crimea has been condemned as a
violation of international law, although the U.N. Security Council has not
acted given Russia’s status as a veto-wielding permanent member. The
United States has called the occupation “a breach of international law,” a
“clear violation” of Ukrainian sovereignty, and “a threat to peace and secur-
ity.”79 British Prime Minister David Cameron similarly stated that “there
can be no excuse for outside military intervention.”80 Acting Ukrainian
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk has called the Russian intervention “a
declaration of war” and has called up military reserves to defend the rest of
Ukraine.81 Such condemnations have not specifically addressed Russia’s r2p
justification, although the clear implication is that all three legal justifica-
72. Id.
73. Christian Ignatzi, Crimea: A Breach of International Law, Deutsche Welle (Mar. 8, 2014), http://
www.dw.de/crimea-a-breach-of-international-law/a-17483425 (discussing the legality of Russia’s inter-
vention from international law and Western European points of view).
74. Smale & Erlanger, supra note 70. R
75. Id.
76. Nick O’Malley, War of the Words at UN over Russia’s Crimea Move, Sydney Morning Herald
(Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/world/war-of-words-at-un-over-russias-crimea-move-20140304-
hvg0c.html.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Shaun Walker & Ian Traynor, Russian Military Moves in Crimea are Declaration of War, Says Ukrain-
ian PM, The Guardian (Mar. 2, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/
ukraine-russia-war-crimea-nato.
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tions offered by Russia were doubtful because there was no real or apparent
threat to Russian nationals and soldiers, or to ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
To be sure, the earlier U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama
in 1989 were also highly controversial and condemned as violations of inter-
national law,82 but such criticism did not question the invocation of r2p as a
legal principle. (Nor, for that matter, did the critics of Russian military
intervention in the Crimea assert that Russia would not have been legally
justified in intervening if ethnic Russians were in fact being slaughtered by
Ukrainian forces.)  Rather, critics of American military interventions in
those instances questioned whether American nationals were really at risk
and whether the measures taken were proportional.83 With respect to the
proportionality issue, invasion and regime change appeared wildly dispro-
portionate to the goal of protecting U.S. civilians, particularly by compari-
son to the Entebbe example. For instance, evacuation would surely have
sufficed in the case of Grenada where there were very few American civil-
ians. The gross disproportionality suggested that r2p was a pretext for other
non-humanitarian reasons for intervention such as the Reagan Administra-
tion’s desire to showcase American military might in Grenada.
In summary, it seems that r2p is viewed as unproblematic in principle
when applied to the use of force to protect nationals in a foreign country
facing a real, imminent risk of group death as at Entebbe. Exhaustion of
peaceful measures and proportionality of the use of force are additional re-
quirements. Any misgivings about r2p focus upon the cases in which it
seems that powerful countries are using civilian protection as a reason for
disproportionate military interventions when their nationals (or people of
the same ethnic origin) are not really at risk—a danger most recently under-
scored by the Russian military intervention in Crimea in 2014.
Importantly, the concept of r2p has been routinely extended in practice to
the use of armed force in unconsenting states to protect or rescue foreign
civilians who are citizens or subjects of third countries who are also in the
danger zone. Entebbe is once again a good example of this principle inas-
much as twenty of the hostages rescued were French national crewmembers,
and some of the hostages were of the Jewish faith but not Israeli nationals. It
might be argued, however, that since the majority of the hostages were Is-
raelis, the rescue of the third-country nationals was merely incidental and
that an Israeli mission to rescue them alone would have been unlawful.
But there have been several other interventions in unconsenting states
where a very large number of civilians protected or evacuated by armed force
were third-country nationals—that is, non-nationals of the intervener or the
target state. In 1990, U.S. troops evacuated approximately 1,000 U.S. and
82. See, e.g., Louis Henkin et al., Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force
54 (2d ed. 1991); Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under International
Law, 84 Am J. Int’l L. 494, 496 (1990).
83. See Henkin, The Invasion of Panama, supra note 12, at 296–97. R
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foreign nationals from Liberia without the approval of the Liberian govern-
ment.84 The overwhelming majority of civilians were not Americans. Profes-
sor Richard Lillich viewed the incident as an affirmation of r2p’s survival as
state practice:
The renewed assertion by the United States of the right of forcible
protection of its nationals during the Liberian disorder, the fact
that hundreds of other foreign nationals from dozens of States
were evacuated with what must have been the enthusiastic (if not
explicit) approval of their governments, and the near-complete
absence of legal or other criticism of the rescue operation all com-
bine to indicate that the international community, now more than
ever in the post-Cold War period is prepared to accept, endorse
or, at the very least tolerate the forcible protection of nationals
abroad in appropriate cases.85
The next year, in 1991, French and Belgian troops—with American
planes—evacuated 6,500 of their own citizens and 2,500 foreign nationals
of over thirty European, African, and Middle Eastern states from Zaire dur-
ing a military mutiny.86 President Mobutu did not approve of the military
intervention and accused the European powers of trying to destabilize his
country.87 Again, Lillich found these to be “legitimate case[s] of forcible
protection” of civilians.88 The instance of using force to protect foreign na-
tionals that may come closest to R2P occurred in 1996. U.S. military forces
flew into northern Iraq, set up a defensive perimeter against Saddam Hus-
sein’s forces, and evacuated approximately 6,500 pro-American Kurds living
in northern Iraq.89 None of the civilians at risk were U.S. nationals; in fact,
they were technically Iraqi nationals who belonged to an ethnic minority.
These cases suggest that whatever the contours of a state’s right under
customary international law to use armed force to protect or rescue its own
citizens in an unconsenting state, the right also extends to rescuing third-
country nationals, even if their sovereign states do not formally request the
protection. This conclusion appears consistent with Article 45(c) of the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state that has
recalled its mission to entrust “the protection . . . of its nationals to a third
State.”90 If r2p encompasses the international legal right of a state to use
armed force within the territory of another unconsenting state in order to
84. Thomas C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 439, 460 (2000).
85. Id. (citing Richard Lillich, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad: the Liberian “Incident” of 1990, 35
German Y.B. Int’l L. 205, 206 (1993)).
86. Lillich, supra note 4, at 105–06. R
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Operation Pacific Haven/Quick Transit, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/mili-
tary/ops/pacific_haven.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
90. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 45(c), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
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protect not only its own civilians but also civilians who are nationals of a
third country, then we are very close to forcible R2P itself. And the only
difference—the perceived sovereign autonomy of the target state to do
whatever it wants to its own civilians including killing certain groups of
them—has been significantly eroded in the twenty-first century by the
proliferation of R2P norms as discussed in the next Part.
III. The Responsibility to Protect Civilians (R2P)
The “Responsibility to Protect” civilians—commonly abbreviated as
RtoP or R2P—is ubiquitous in current international policy and law discus-
sions. Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu called it “the most significant de-
velopment in the defense of human rights since . . . the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in the aftermath of World War II and the
Holocaust.”91 It was unanimously adopted by more than 170 heads of state
at the 2005 United Nations World Summit.92 The U.N. Security Council
has passed two thematic resolutions addressing R2P,93 and, most impor-
tantly, one operational resolution under Chapter VII invoking R2P as a jus-
tification for the use of military force in the Libyan civil war in 2011.94
U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has issued a report card each year
from 2009 to 2012 monitoring its implementation and progress.95 And R2P
commentary and scholarship in blogs, newspapers, foreign policy magazines,
law journals, and books are ubiquitous.96
91. Vaclav Havel & Desmond M. Tutu, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of
Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time xxv (Jared Genser & Irwin Cotler eds., 2012).
92. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 71,
U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect].
93. S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006); S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894
(Nov. 11, 2009).
94. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
95. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012); U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of Regional
and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011); U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the
Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010); Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 92. R
96. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in Human Rights, Intervention, and the
Use of Force 275 (Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald eds., 2008); Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to
Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (2009); Evans, supra note 2; Saira R
Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 Stan. J. Int’l L. 319 (2012); Merhdad Payandeh,
With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of
International Lawmaking, 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 469 (2010); Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Consti-
tutional Moment?, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 298, 303 (2012); Neomi Rao, The Choice to Protect: Rethinking
Responsibility for Humanitarian Intervention, 44 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 697 (2013); Noele Crossley,
The Responsibility to Protect in 2012: R2P fails in Syria, Brazil’s ‘RWP’ Emerges, Global Pol’y (Dec. 28,
2012), http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/28/12/2012/responsibility-protect-2012-r2p-fails-
syria-brazil%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98rwp%E2%80%99-emerges; Stewart Patrick, A New Lease on
Life for Humanitarianism: How Operation Odyssey Dawn Will Revive RtoP, Foreign Aff. (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67674/stewart-patrick/a-new-lease-on-life-for-humanitarianism;
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There is, however, a surprising lack of clarity about what exactly R2P is.
The responsibility to protect has been called, among other things, a “con-
cept,” a “principle,” a “norm,”97 an “initiative,”98 a “policy agenda”99 and
a “framework.”100 Where to find a working definition in the clutter? The
U.N. Secretary-General’s most recent annual R2P report from 2012 seems a
logical place to start. It states that the “responsibility to protect provides a
political framework based on fundamental principles of international law for
preventing and responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity.”101
Secretary-General Ban’s definition deftly handles one aspect of R2P on
which there appears to be a general consensus: R2P is not yet “law.” Ac-
cording to the Secretary-General’s report, R2P is not international law but
rather “a political framework based on fundamental principles of interna-
tional law.”102 An International Criminal Court official, in 2007, concluded
that R2P was not even a “political framework,” but rather “a political
catchword rather than a legal norm.”103 William Burke-White summed it
up this way in 2012:
What the Responsibility to Protect is not, however, is an interna-
tional legal rule. It has not been codified in an international
treaty; it lacks the state practice and sufficient opinio juris to give
rise to customary international law; and it does not qualify as a
general princip[le] of law. Instead, the Responsibility to Protect is
best understood as a norm of international conduct.104
But what is the relevant “norm of international conduct” signified by R2P?
To get a sense of what the responsibility to protect has come to mean today,
it is necessary to understand the recent history of human rights crises and
interventions (and non-interventions) that led to R2P’s creation.
There have been three phases in R2P’s evolution during the dozen or so
years of its existence: (1) 2001 to 2005: genesis as a workaround to the
obstacle posed by exclusive sovereignty for military intervention in humani-
tarian crises; (2) 2005 to 2011: interlude as a twenty-first century agenda for
David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/
opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
97. Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 Am. J. Int’l
L. 99 (2007).
98. Lloyd Axworthy & Allan Rock, R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda, 1 Global Resp. to Protect
54, 63 (2009).
99. Bellamy, supra note 3, at 158. R
100. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention, 1 Global Resp. to Pro-
tect 442, 442 (2009).
101. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
102. See id.
103. See Stahn, supra note 97, at 120. R
104. William Burke-White, Adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, in The Responsibility to Pro-
tect 17, 34 (Jared Genser & Irvin Cotler eds., 2011).
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engaging the world community in state-building and democracy promotion
in oppressive or failed states; and (3) 2011 to the present: resurgence as a
term to describe a process and justification for military intervention in for-
eign states in Southwest Asia and Africa. In the third and present phase, the
juxtaposition of the NATO military intervention in Libya and the non-in-
terventions to date in Syria and South Sudan raises difficult questions about
the future of R2P. Part IV of this Article will argue that these questions can
be addressed by a two-track framework for forcible R2P that distinguishes
between: (1) a requirement of U.N. Security Council authorization in all
cases not involving state-sponsored mass killings and (2) an alternative track
for military intervention in cases involving an imminent risk of group exter-
mination, such as genocide, massacre crimes against humanity, and the use
of weapons of mass destruction. The idea that a state can intervene without
U.N. Security Council authorization to save people facing group death in an
unconsenting foreign state is the logical extension of r2p in an era where the
R2P norm has pierced the veil of exclusive sovereignty which formerly
shielded a state’s conduct toward its people from the coverage of interna-
tional law and the scrutiny of other states.  But before making this norma-
tive claim, it is necessary to describe in detail the origin and history of R2P.
A. R2P’s Genesis: A Call to Arms
R2P originated in reaction to the world community’s controversial re-
sponses to the great humanitarian crises of the 1990s. With the end of the
Cold War and the stunning victory against Saddam Hussein in the First
Gulf War, the start of the decade inspired great hope for the United Na-
tions, international leaders, and global human rights advocates. The dream
of one world community without war and with basic rights for all human
beings seemed achievable. A specific cause for hope was the potential for a
productive marriage of opposites: state-organized monopolies of violence
and global human rights. The military might of the United States and its
estimable NATO allies was now deprived of a worthy sovereign state enemy;
why not deploy it to protect people at risk around the world? The basic
right of every human being to life resonated deeply with the democratic
foundation myth and ideals of the United States. And, from a practical per-
spective, it was a brilliant tactic to align the interests of an American mili-
tary-industrial complex searching for new missions to justify defense
spending with the interests of human rights activists and non-governmental
organizations (“NGO”), in a reverse Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to save
lives.105
105. From the end of the First Gulf War in 1992 until September 11, 2001, there was a search for
new military missions to justify American defense spending. The one enduring Cold War conflict during
that period, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, reached a crisis point in July 1994, but was
substantially mitigated by the negotiation of the Nuclear Framework Agreement in late 1994. Thus, in
addition to the humanitarian interventions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, American troops were
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1. Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia
It had started well. In late 1992, the United States sent more than twenty
thousand hard-charging marines into Somalia to assist in famine relief as
part of a U.N. Security Council authorized mission106 during a bloody civil
war that would claim an estimated 800,000 lives.107 A year and a half later,
after the deaths of eighteen American soldiers in the disastrous battle of
Mogadishu recounted in the book and movie “Black Hawk Down,”108
American troops were pulled out, even as the crisis in the failed Somali state
endured.109 The ignominious withdrawal occurred amidst U.S. accusations
of botched planning and mission creep by the United Nations, and other
countries’ rejoinders of the U.S. military’s obsession with punitive missions
against one anti-American Somali warlord. Stung by Mogadishu, the United
States stood by when the genocide of more than half a million Tutsis by
radical Hutus in Rwanda started in April 1994, one month after the last
American soldier had been withdrawn from Somalia.110 The rest of the world
followed suit, with a token U.N. peacekeeping force and a few foreign aid
used in the mid-late 1990s in counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and Latin American, enforce-
ment of economic sanctions against Iraq, noncombatant evacuations in Liberia, and new types of intelli-
gence and reconnaissance operations around the world.
106. The U.N. Security Council first took action on January 23 through Resolution 733 (1992),
which urged all parties of the Somali conflict to cease hostilities and requested all states to immediately
implement an arms embargo to the country. As the civil war continued and deaths from famine and war
mounted, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolutions to establish an official United Nations Opera-
tion in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor a ceasefire, sponsor peace talks, and stem the famine. S.C. Res.
746, U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (Mar. 17, 1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992). After
these measures failed to solve the crisis, the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter, issued Resolution 794 (1992) authorizing the use of “all necessary means to establish as soon as
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” The Resolution called on
member states that were in a position to do so to provide military forces for the United Task Force
(UNITAF), which was deployed in Mogadishu on December 9, 1992. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
775 (Aug. 28, 1992); S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992). U.S. military forces led
and constituted the majority of troops in UNITAF: some 25,000 of the 37,000 in the contingent.
107. The United Nations estimates that 300,000 Somalis died in the civil war and hunger crisis in
the early 1990s alone. Somalia-UNOSOM I: Background, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014). Organizations such as
the Center for American Progress estimate that between 450,000 and 1.5 million people have lost their
lives and nearly 800,000 have become refugees due to violence or hunger in the ongoing conflict. The
international community has contributed an estimated $55 billion responding to the crisis since 1991.
$20 billion alone has been spent on peacekeeping, military intervention, diplomacy, and humanitarian
and development aid. John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of
Failure in Somalia, Ctr. Am. Progress (Sept. 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/
pdf/somalia.pdf.
108. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (1999).
109. Arguably, the withdrawal was driven by domestic politics. President Bill Clinton was relatively
new in office, and the Somalia intervention was something that his predecessor George H. W. Bush had
started. One can imagine a different reaction if the crisis had broken in Clinton’s second term, by which
time he had developed a much more forceful and experienced position on foreign policy and the use of
force abroad.
110. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, Hum. Rts. Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-04.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2009).
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workers on the ground in Rwanda incapable of saving more than a handful
of lives through scattered instances of individual heroism.111
The subsequent, more forceful reaction of the United States and its
NATO allies to humanitarian crises in the former Yugoslavia may have
saved lives, but it also complicated the legal, political, and moral calculus of
military interventions for humanitarian ends. Between 1992 and 1995, an
estimated 200,000 people died in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
during a bloody civil war between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serb sepa-
ratists aided by Serbia.112 Bosnian Serb bombings of towns and villages sus-
pected of harboring enemy fighters caused many deaths. The Bosnian Serbs
launched a campaign to carve out exclusively Serbian enclaves in the country
by forcing everyone else to leave—a practice known as “ethnic cleansing.”
The nadir of the crisis for the United Nations came when Bosnian Serbs
crossed the line between ethnic cleansing and genocide. In July 1995, close
to 8,000 Muslims (mostly men) who had sought refuge in a U.N. “safe
area” in Srebrenica disappeared while in the custody of Bosnian Serb forces
led by Ratko Mladic.113 A small group of Dutch U.N. peacekeepers was on
the ground but they did nothing to intervene.114
Once news of the Srebrenica massacre and other mass atrocities in Bosnia
came to light, then U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali met with
U.S., EU, and other world leaders to discuss more forcible measures in Bos-
nia. The discussions resulted in a working agreement between the U.N.
Security Council and NATO countries for NATO to conduct air strikes on
Serb military forces subject to veto by the military Special Representative of
the Secretary-General.115 The bombings forced the parties to the negotiating
table. The United States and Russia, Serbia’s major ally, brokered a peace
agreement, the Dayton Accords of 1995.116 The Accords established a frame-
work that ended the civil war and set up a unitary sovereign state consisting
of two autonomous republics composed of majority Bosnian Muslims and
Croats (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Bosnian Serbs (Repub-
lika Srpska).117
111. ICISS Report, supra note 1. R
112. Estimate made by the ICRC. Statement by Dr. Haris Silajdzˇic´, Chairman of the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Head of Delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at 63rd Session of the General
Assembly, on the occasion of General Debate (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.un.org/ga/63/generaldebate/
pdf/bosniaherzegovina_en.pdf.
113. The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of UN Peacekeeping: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hum. Rts.
Watch (Oct. 1995), at 69, available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/bosnia1095web.pdf
114. Id. at 14–17.
115. Air Univ., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 45 (Col.
Robert C. Owen ed., 2000); Eric Schmitt, NATO Shifts Focus of its Air Attacks on Bosnian Serbs, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/11/world/nato-shifts-focus-of-its-air-attacks-
on-bosnian-serbs.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
116. General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov. 30, 1995, U.N. Doc.
A/50/790, available at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/BoH%2019951121.pdf.
117. See generally id.
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Other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia watched the Dayton Ac-
cords, hoping for similar great-power brokered accommodations. Russia and
the United States and its NATO allies, however, viewed the Accords as a
one-time deal to end the war in Bosnia, not as a comprehensive plan for
peace in all of former Yugoslavia. Frustrated hopes led to renewed war.
2. Kosovo
The next flashpoint was Kosovo, a relatively autonomous province of Yu-
goslavia that remained administratively a part of Serbia but with a popula-
tion that was ninety percent Albanian. Starting in 1996, Kosovar Albanian
hostility to Serbian rule took an increasingly violent turn led by a guerrilla
force that called itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”). From 1996 to
1998, an estimated one million ethnic Albanians were forcibly relocated or
fled violence in the region, giving rise to claims of ethnic cleansing.118
Although there was no large massacre of unarmed civilians as in Bosnia,
and deaths from fighting were not as numerous (11,000 as estimated by the
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”)),119 the war was ugly and bloody, with allegations of war crimes
by both Serbian forces and the KLA.120 A ceasefire was brokered in late 1998
by Richard Holbrooke, prime mover behind the Dayton Accords while at
the State Department, and monitored by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”).121 But the ceasefire broke down in late
1998, and Serbian forces renewed an offensive against the KLA.122 Between
March and June 1999, NATO launched a serious and sustained bombing
campaign against targets in Kosovo and other Serbian parts of former Yugo-
slavia to stem the offensive.123 Over 6,303 tons of ordnance was dropped on
targets including troop formations, military hardware, power stations, and
government buildings and facilities. There were 38,004 sorties run with,
miraculously, no casualties to NATO airmen and soldiers attributed to en-
118. Peter Finn, Refugees Want Kosovo Free of Serbs, Wash. Post (June 6, 1999), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/refugees060699.htm.
119. Press Briefing, War Crimes Tribunal Prosecutors (Nov. 10, 1999), http://www.un.org/News/
briefings/docs/1999/19991110.delponte.brf.doc.html.
120. Kosovo/Albania: Investigate Alleged KLA Crimes, Hum. Rts. Watch (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.
hrw.org/news/2010/12/15/kosovoalbania-investigate-alleged-kla-crimes; Nicholas Schmidle, Bring up the
Bodies: Kosovo’s leaders have been accused of grotesque war crimes. But can anyone prove it?, New Yorker (May
6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/06/130506fa_fact_schmidle.
121. Interview by PBS Frontline with Richard Holbrooke, Diplomat and Former United States Am-
bassador to the United Nations, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/in-
terviews/holbrooke.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2014).
122. Id.
123. See United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Final Report to the Prosecu-
tor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, available at www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
It was revealed after the fact that a NATO ground invasion was a serious possibility pushed especially by
the British and that secret plans were drawn up. See Dana Priest, Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War,
Wash. Post (Sept. 19, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/sept99/airwar19.
htm. It would have been the first war fought by NATO troops.
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emy fire, and an estimated 500 casualties to Serbian military and civil-
ians.124 Serbia ultimately capitulated. A framework for peace was negotiated
that essentially preserved status quo autonomy for Kosovo, with Serbia
forced to concede sovereignty on the ground to a U.N. peacekeeping force.
NATO’s decisive intervention in Kosovo raised at least two sets of diffi-
cult questions. First, for international lawyers, the burning process question
was whether the bombings were legal in the absence of U.N. Security Coun-
cil preauthorization.125 Russia, by tradition Serbia’s ally and NATO’s foe,
was a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a surefire veto
against any authorization of military force in Kosovo. China, another perma-
nent member, had its own problems with ethnic minorities clamoring for
self-determination. It was naturally sympathetic to the Serbian position and
generally suspicious of the geopolitical agenda of the United States and its
Western European allies who were permanent members—the United King-
dom and France. The NATO allies did seek and obtain a U.N. Security
Council resolution after the fact, affirming the negotiated peace in Ko-
sovo.126 The resolution might charitably be construed as a post-hoc ratifica-
tion of the bombings that had led to the peace. And, after all, the bombings
were not the unilateral acts of one sovereign, but rather collective action by a
regional security alliance (that is, NATO), albeit one that did not count the
target country of intervention as a member. But neither mitigating factor
justified the NATO bombings as measured against the bright-line ortho-
doxy that the use of armed force in international affairs is only lawful in self-
defense or with U.N. Security Council preauthorization.
Second, deeper political and moral questions were raised by the troubling
juxtaposition of the more effective military interventions in Europe and the
failure of interventions in sub-Saharan Africa, despite the far greater scale of
human suffering in the latter. Deaths in Rwanda were in the half million to
million range, with most of the genocide of Tutsis occurring over a span of
several weeks.127 Estimates of deaths in three years of war in Bosnia were
about 300,000 lives; in the two years of sustained conflict in Kosovo, about
11,000.128 Were the differing outcomes to be explained by morally indefen-
sible perceptions of the relative worth of the lives saved? Did the facts sug-
gest that a European life was perceived by the citizens and leaders of states
with the military power to intervene to be worth between two and fifty
times more than a human life in sub-Saharan Africa, with the presumptive
values of lives in West Asia or North Africa somewhere in between? Such
124. W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality during the NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia,
12 Eur. J. Int’l L. 489, 490, 492 (2001).
125. Henkin, supra note 18, at 824. R
126. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement.
127. Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda 1 (1999).
128. Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, 356–57 (2005).
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uncomfortable questions were natural and insistent, particularly from the
perspective of global human rights advocates.
But what if the main reason for the stark disparity across the cases was not
unconscionable prejudice but rather the political self-interest of sovereign
states? The lesson, then, may have been that powerful states or NATO will
intervene in their backyards (Kosovo was 500 miles from Athens, 570 miles
from Istanbul, and 1,100 miles from Berlin and Rome)129 or where their
material interests are implicated, but not to save strangers in faraway places.
Regardless of whether the pattern of past interventions was caused by
prejudice or self-interest as a descriptive matter, it seems imperative from a
normative perspective that any international law doctrine permitting hu-
manitarian intervention should be free from either bias in application. One
logical way to ensure this would be to enforce a more permissive standard
for authorizing the use of armed force in the most severe humanitarian
crises.
3. The 2001 ICISS Report and the Foundational Articulation of R2P
It was shortly after Kosovo that the Responsibility to Protect entered
mainstream international policy discussions. The crucial event was the De-
cember 2001 release of the report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty (“ICISS”), which had been formed at Canada’s
urging at the U.N. Millennium Assembly in September 2000.130 The Com-
mission’s goal was to build an “international consensus on how to respond
in the face of massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law.”131
R2P was the conceptual fulcrum of the Commission’s effort to overcome the
sovereignty obstacle to humanitarian intervention, and, indeed, to change
the terms of the discourse about humanitarian intervention itself.
As set forth in the Commission’s report, the responsibility to protect was
not one concept but rather a cluster of ideas centered upon a sovereign
state’s responsibility to protect its people. The cluster had three “pillars”:
(1) a sovereign state has a basic responsibility to protect civilians within its
borders; (2) the rest of the world has a responsibility to ensure that every
state honors its responsibility to protect; and (3) if a state fails in its respon-
129. Furthermore, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had formally joined NATO on March
12, 1999, twelve days before the NATO bombing campaign started on March 24, 1999. Paul E. Gallis,
Cong. Research Serv., RL30374, Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force
17–19 (1999). Hungary shared a border with Serbia and its capital Budapest was only 350 miles from
Kosovo. Id. Prague and Warsaw were 620 miles and 660 miles away from Kosovo, respectively. Id.
Overall, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were somewhat wary of the NATO campaign. None
of the three nations contributed combat troops or air support; however, they all expressed at least tacit
approval and granted overflight rights. Id. Poland was the most removed actor but the Polish govern-
ment vocally supported the air strikes, calling the campaign “justified.” Id. Hungary and the Czech
Republic offered their air space and facilities despite a split in public opinion polls amongst their citizens
and conflicting rhetoric from government officials. Id.
130. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at VII. R
131. Id. at 81.
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sibility, then other states may use armed force to protect the lives of the
civilians at risk instead.132 The ICISS Report went on to describe the sorts of
mass atrocities the commission of which would trigger other states’ respon-
sibility to intervene militarily. These predicate offenses were genocide,
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes. An implicit
point of the enumeration was that forcible R2P was an extreme measure to
redress serious transgressions of human rights, not all violations of interna-
tional law or of international human rights. The Commission did not define
these four offenses in great detail, relying instead on their formulation in
international law.
The third of the three pillars mentioned above, “forcible R2P,” was the
centerpiece of the Commission’s foundational conceptualization of R2P in
2001. The Commission also discussed peaceable measures that other states
could take to end mass atrocities, what it called the “responsibility to pre-
vent” and the “responsibility to rebuild.” But, unsurprisingly in the wake
of controversy over the legality of the Kosovo intervention, the use of armed
force was the clear focal point of the Commission’s report. The phrase “mili-
tary intervention” appeared ninety-six times in its seventy-five pages.133 The
ICISS Report began: “This report is about the so-called ‘right of humanita-
rian intervention’: the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to
take coercive—and in particular military—action, against another state for
the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.”134 Although, as
noted above, the ICISS Report acknowledged alternatives to military inter-
vention, the heart of the ICISS Report addressed “planning for,” “carrying
out,” and “following up” on military intervention. This emphasis on forci-
ble R2P was characteristic of early responsibility-to-protect commentary in
the first couple years of the new millennium.135
Another interesting feature of the 2001 ICISS Report was its position on
whether U.N. Security Council authorization was legally required—the
burning question after Kosovo. The Report implied that U.N. authoriza-
tion, although highly desirable, was not absolutely necessary.136 The Com-
mission did require an initial attempt to get U.N. Security Council
preapproval, memorably referring to the U.N. Security Council as the “first
port of call on any matter relating to military intervention for human pro-
tection purposes.”137 The ICISS Report clearly stated that “Security Council
132. See id. at XI.
133. See id. passim.
134. Id. at VII.
135. See, e.g., Eleanor Lumsden, An Uneasy Peace: Multilateral Military Intervention in Civil Wars, 35
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 795 (2002–2003); Nicholas J. Wheeler, Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention:
Principles and Procedures, 2 Melb. J. Int’l L. 550 (2001).
136. See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at 49–55. R
137. Id. at 53.
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authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any military interven-
tion,”138 but it did not say that such authorization was required.
Indeed, in an intriguing part of the ICISS Report entitled “When the
Security Council Fails to Act,” the Commission outlined two options in the
event of U.N. Security Council inertia or inaction.139 The first option was to
get an “overwhelming majority”140 of affirmative votes in the General As-
sembly under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution (“UFP”), which was
sponsored in 1950 by the United States as a workaround to U.N. Security
Council deadlock.141 The UFP mechanism has been relegated to interna-
tional law purgatory today; the United States acknowledges paternity but
has become an estranged parent, given the changed demographics of the
General Assembly. Nonetheless, it was not altogether unreasonable for the
Commission to assert that it remained customary law despite its tension
with the U.N. Charter’s direct provisions on the use of force, given its U.S.-
origin pedigree and the large margin of approval just five years after the
U.N. Charter was ratified (eighty-eight percent of all U.N. members—fifty-
138. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
139. See id. at 53–55. “In the view of the Council’s past inability or unwillingness to fulfill the role
expected of it, if the U.N. Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention when humanita-
rian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to deal with such a proposal
within a reasonable time it is difficult to argue that alternative means of discharging the responsibility to
protect can be entirely discounted.” Id. at 53–55. In a newspaper editorial, former U.S. State Department
Legal Adviser John B. Bellinger III expressed a similar sentiment with respect to the crisis in Syria,
writing that “when the Security Council is blocked from protecting civilians against the most egregious
atrocities, the United States should be prepared to intervene when other avenues have been exhausted and
there is sufficient international consensus to support intervention.” John B. Bellinger III, U.N. rules and
Syrian intervention, Wash. Post (Jan. 17, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-17/opin-
ions/36410395_1_syrian-opposition-assad-regime-intervention.
140. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at 53. R
141. Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/377 (V) (Nov. 3, 1950). The Resolu-
tion states, in relevant part:
Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent mem-
bers to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto. . . .
. . . .
Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights
or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. . . .
. . . .
Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to mak-
ing appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of
a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or
restore international peace and security. (final emphasis added).
Id. It was principally drafted and proposed by the United States, and, for that reason, is also known as the
“Acheson Plan” after then-Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The resolution was passed by a super-major-
ity vote of fifty-two to five—with Soviet bloc members voting no and two abstentions (India and
Argentina).
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two yes, five no, two abstentions).142 The Commission suggested a
supermajority threshold of a two-thirds majority of affirmative votes in the
General Assembly as the trigger for an R2P military intervention.143 This
was a sufficiently high threshold that the Commission acknowledged the
“unlikelihood” of obtaining General Assembly authorization “in any but
very exceptional case[s],” but opined that “Kosovo and Rwanda might just
conceivably have been such cases.”144 The Commission presented the Gen-
eral Assembly UFP option as a substitute to U.N. Security Council
preauthorization, although it stated that its main purpose in outlining the
“mere possibility” of the option was to create “an important additional
form of leverage on the Security Council to encourage it to act decisively and
appropriately.”145
The second option was “collective intervention to be pursued by a re-
gional or sub-regional organization acting within its defin[ed] bounda-
ries.”146 Neighboring countries that are specially affected by humanitarian
disasters because of refugee flows and rebels operating across borders are
generally “more familiar with the actors and personalities involved in the
conflict, and have a greater stake in overseeing a return to peace and prosper-
ity.”147 Moreover, the involvement of regional organizations of states is con-
templated in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which, however, explicitly
requires U.N. Security Council authorization.148 The Commission added the
lawyerly argument that a post hoc authorization might suffice for purposes of
the Charter, pointing out that “there are recent cases when approval has
been sought . . . after the event (Liberia and Sierra Leone) and there may be
certain leeway for future action in this regard.”149 With respect to regional
interventions, the ICISS Report made one more important point: “It is
much more controversial when a regional organization acts, not against a
member or within its area of membership, but against a non-member.”150
The rider was obviously addressed to the air bombing by NATO forces in
the former Yugoslavia in 1999, since Serbia was not a NATO member. The
Commission pointed out that NATO justified its intervention by invoking
142. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302d plen. mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. A/PV.302 (Nov. 3, 1950).
143. The Commission likely chose two-thirds based on Article 18 of the U.N. Charter, which states,
“Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of
the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 18(2).
144. Rwanda maybe, but Kosovo? It may be true that a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly (129
of the 193 current members) will be easier to get than an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen U.N.
Security Council members without a veto from one of the five permanent members.
145. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at 53. R
146. Id.
147. Id. at 54.
148. “[N]o enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council . . . .” U.N. Charter art. 53(1).
149. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at 54. R
150. Id.
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the same “spill over” and “severe disruption” arguments used by regional
organizations intervening in member states.151
To summarize, the foundational R2P Report of the International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty focused on military interven-
tion or forcible R2P and concluded that U.N. Security Council
preauthorization was not required in all cases. The ICISS Report said that
such authorization should always be sought before the use of armed force,
but that supermajority approval of the General Assembly or collective mea-
sures by regional organizations in member states were alternative options in
case of U.N. Security Council inaction or deadlock. In the case of regional
interventions, the Commission strongly urged seeking U.N. Security Coun-
cil authorization after the fact if not obtained ex ante, and singled out the
controversiality of interventions by regional organizations in non-member
states but did not condemn them. The Commission’s ICISS Report did not
discuss these two alternatives in terms of legality but rather as policy op-
tions consistent with R2P.
B. Farewell to Arms: The Demilitarization of R2P
A year or so before the unanimous adoption of R2P by state leaders at the
2005 U.N. World Summit, there was a shift in the characterization of R2P
away from the military aspect that dominated the 2001 ICISS Report. In-
stead, R2P discussions within the United Nations and among international
lawyers and policy experts focused more on articulating and implementing a
framework or strategy for encouraging responsibility within troubled states
and involvement by other states before a humanitarian crisis erupted.
R2P advocates thus elevated the responsibility to prevent to center stage;
R2P’s peace corps replaced its marine corps. In 2007, the United Nations
created the position of a special adviser for R2P as a focal point for peace-
time initiatives that transcended the sovereignty obstacle. The most positive
press about the responsibility to protect civilians during this period con-
cerned its peaceable role in ending a violent standoff between ethnic groups
in Kenya after contested elections in December 2007 that had claimed
1,500 lives.152 When, in May 2008, a cataclysmic cyclone killed 150,000
people and displaced 1.5 million others in Myanmar, a lively discussion at
the U.N. Security Council revolved around whether R2P was “in play” such
that other countries could render humanitarian assistance without a sover-
eign state’s consent when it was incapable of caring for its people in the
wake of natural disaster, yet wary of inviting foreign assistance.153 Military
151. Id.
152. See Bellamy, supra note 3, at 154 (“In sharp contrast to the treatment of Darfur, the diplomatic R
response to the ethnic violence that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed December 2007 elections in
Kenya is widely trumpeted as the best example of RtoP in practice.”).
153. See Julian Borger & Ian MacKinnon, Bypass Junta’s Permission for Aid, US and France Urge, The
Guardian (May 9, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/09/cyclonenargis.burma.
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operations were no longer framed as the main event, but rather as a “last
resort” in case of failure of an ongoing process of preventative assistance and
monitoring to save civilian lives in target states.154
Nowhere was this shift in R2P identity more evident than in the 2009
Report of the U.N. Secretary-General entitled Implementing the Responsibility
to Protect.155 Addressing the General Assembly, the Secretary-General decried
the false choice presumed by humanitarians and world leaders in the last
years of the twentieth century and the first years of the twenty-first of “ei-
ther standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coer-
cive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened populations.”156
Instead, he argued: “What is most needed, from the perspective of the re-
sponsibility to protect, are assistance programmes that are carefully targeted
to build specific capacities within societies that would make them less likely
to travel the path to crimes relating to the responsibility to protect.”157 The
Secretary opined that this capacity building, paired with human rights mon-
itoring, advocacy, and education, represented the greatest hope for avoiding
the predicate crimes that would trigger the need for military action with all
its grave domestic and international consequences. The Secretary’s perspec-
tive was shared by many in the academy and policy circles:158 the center of
the R2P cluster of ideas had migrated away from enforcement and the use of
154. S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) (reaffirming a commitment to the
protection of civilians in zones of armed conflict and calling for the creation of conditions to allow
humanitarian assistance); S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006) (reaffirming a commit-
ment to human rights and calling on member states to support and enable states to meet their responsi-
bilities to their citizens). Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 94; U.N. Secretary-General, R
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/
2012/578 (July 25, 2012) (emphasizing the close relationship between prevention and response); U.N.
Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 27, 2011) (articulating the
three pillar strategy of promoting state internalization of humanitarian norms, capacity building and
international assistance, and timely and decisive responses to responsibility to protect crimes); U.N.
Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010) (reaffirming the importance of early warning and assessment in
responding to responsibility to protect crimes).
155. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 92.
156. Id. ¶ 7.
157. Id. ¶ 44.
158. See, e.g., Bellamy, supra note 3, at 163–67. R
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armed force to prevention, democracy promotion,159 and state building
under the R2P label.160
Understanding why R2P was pacified between genesis in 2001 and the
2005 World Summit and subsequent years requires an understanding of the
geopolitical context. There were, in my view, three reasons for the shift.
First, independent of world political developments, it is possible that the
change in emphasis resulted in part from normative concerns. On the one
hand, international policymakers may have held or developed a good-faith
belief that it was more important to invest in crime prevention in states
where civilians appeared at risk rather than enforcement after the risk had
matured into deaths and suffering.161 The “pull” of this belief likely inter-
acted with the “push” factor of the resistance of states with poor human
rights records against the heightened prospect of outside military interven-
tion represented by forcible R2P. This concern was surely exacerbated by the
substantive ambiguity of definitions of war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, and ethnic cleansing, and by the insinuation of the 2001 ICISS Report
that U.N. Security Council preauthorization was not a requirement for forci-
ble R2P.
The second and third reasons for the shift had a common thread in the
United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq. The invasion started in March, which
was around the time civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan erupted. The
worst of the carnage in Darfur occurred from 2003 to 2004, with credible
evidence of group murders, hacking off of limbs, and gang rapes of civilians,
particularly by pro-government paramilitary herders (the so-called
159. A little discussed prototype of R2P was the sequence of actions in Haiti during the early 1990s,
which was overshadowed by the more cataclysmic humanitarian crises in Somalia and Rwanda. In 1991,
a military coup had toppled the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The U.N. Se-
curity Council initially passed economic sanctions and set up a U.N. Mission to monitor the situation on
the ground, but when these proved ineffective in spurring a return to democratic government, the Secur-
ity Council authorized member states to stand up “a multinational force” with permission “to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, . . . the prompt return of
the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of
Haiti.” S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994). The Resolution thus framed the principal
reason for the military intervention in terms of democratic regime change (or restoration) but it also
declared that the Council was motivated to act because it was “[g]ravely concerned by the significant
further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by
the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, [and] the desperate plight of Haitian
refugees.” Id. In September 1994, just as the U.N.-authorized military force, comprised almost entirely
of U.S. air, ground, and naval forces, was on the verge of invading Haiti, former U.S. president Jimmy
Carter negotiated a peaceful exchange of power with the military regime.
160. The change in the framing of R2P as an ongoing and reiterative process rather than a substantive
norm or doctrine is not unlike policymakers’ description of the GATT/WTO international trade law
regime as a process toward harmonization rather than as a raft of substantive legal rules embodying the
norm of free trade. World Trade Org., Understanding the WTO (5th ed. 2011), at 9, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.
161. See generally, e.g., Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Geno-
cide in Rwanda (2001) (asserting that military intervention would have been too late to stop the
genocide).
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“Janjaweed”).162 Hundreds of thousands of civilians fled to escape the vio-
lence. There was a good case to be made for crimes against humanity, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and even incipient genocide, but the atrocities in
Darfur coincided with the brunt of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. Human
right advocates and U.N. leaders repeatedly invoked the R2P mantra but to
no avail. Neither the United States nor any country with the military where-
withal to make a difference seriously contemplated military enforcement in a
part of the world that had little strategic or economic value. To be sure,
there was a good chance of a veto from China (an ally of Sudan) if the matter
had been brought before the Security Council for a discussion about a mili-
tary intervention, but no one attempted it.163
One lesson to be drawn from the failure of forcible R2P in Darfur was
that it was pointless to invoke it in a dramatically altered geopolitical con-
text. Even as the landmark ICISS report on R2P was “largely completed,”164
9/11 had signaled the end of a rare decade of relative peace for the world’s
most powerful states, including the United States, the leading military
power and an indispensable party for large-scale humanitarian intervention
given its unique capacity to project and support armed force across great
distances. In March 2003, the United States, with George W. Bush as Presi-
dent, was fighting not just Saddam Hussein but also a global war against
terror in Afghanistan. Even now, with U.S. military involvement in Iraq
over and the war in Afghanistan winding down, the exponential rise of Chi-
nese economic power and accompanying military might, strains on U.S.-
Russia relations, the collapse of the Framework Agreement with North Ko-
rea and Iranian initiatives to develop nuclear weapons, have all combined to
create a more perilous threat environment for the United States than before
9/11, even as an economic downturn has created pressure to decrease mili-
tary spending. This reality has significantly diminished the prospect that
R2P advocates will be able to mobilize American military participation in a
humanitarian intervention. Thus, a second reason for the demilitarization of
R2P among international leaders and policymakers may be skepticism about
the availability of the resources and political will for armed humanitarian
interventions.
A third possible reason why the R2P community grew more skeptical
about forcible R2P was a concern about pretextual invocations. The invasion
of Iraq in 2003 was a case in point. Before the war, the Americans and
British had justified invasion principally as an enforcement action based on
their evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in
162. Human Rights Watch, Abuses in Darfur by Government Forces, in Darfur in Flames: Atroci-
ties in Western Sudan (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/4.htm.
163. See Cristina Badescu & Linnea Bergholm, Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 40
Security Dialogue 287, 297 (2009).
164. ICISS Report, supra note 1, at VIII. R
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violation of pre-existing U.N. Security Council Resolutions.165 It soon be-
came clear that there were no weapons of mass destruction. At this point,
some pro-war apologists seized on what had previously been a minor
theme—the rationale of humanitarian intervention on behalf of Kurds and
oppressed Iraqis—as justification for the invasion.166 This struck many in-
ternational lawyers as pretextual.167 If the experience of the 1990s had
taught globalists the danger of doing nothing, the Second Gulf War rein-
forced the danger of pretextual invocations.168
Fears of forcible R2P as pretext were reinforced by hostilities between
Georgia and Russia a few months prior to the Secretary-General’s January
2009 Report. In August 2008, Georgian government forces launched an
offensive to reclaim South Ossetia, a Lilliputian republic (estimated popula-
tion of 70,000 in 2007) that had broken away from Georgia in 1992 after an
armed conflict concluded by a Russia-brokered ceasefire. The Georgian inva-
sion resulted in the deaths of several Russian peacekeepers deployed in the
region under the 1992 peace agreement. Russia intervened with overwhelm-
ing military force, launching a counter-offensive that not only pushed Geor-
gian forces out of South Ossetia but also expanded fighting into Georgia
proper. As justification Russia invoked both self-defense, based on the
deaths of the peacekeepers and threat to residents to whom it offered Rus-
sian nationality as a fig leaf for r2p, and R2P, based on allegations of ethnic
cleansing of South Ossetians.169
R2P advocates cried foul. Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minis-
ter and co-chair of the ICISS Committee that wrote the 2001 Report, as-
serted that the R2P norm was inapplicable to Russia’s intervention insofar
as it was undertaken to protect Russian citizens.170 He continued that even
if the R2P norm did apply with respect to Georgian oppression of South
Ossetian civilians, Russia did not adhere to R2P’s established contours by
failing to present credible evidence of predicate offenses like war crimes or
crimes against humanity, by not going to the Security Council first to seek
165. See U.N.S.C., 4701st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701 (Feb. 5, 2003); Press Release, Briefing
Security Council, U.S. Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq’s Failure to Disarm, U.N. Press
Release SC/7658; Michael R. Gordon & Judith Miller, Threats and Responses: The Iraqis; U.S. Says Hussein
Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/
world/threats-responses-iraqis-us-says-hussein-intensifies-quest-for-bomb-parts.html?pagewanted=all&
src=pm.
166. See generally, e.g., Jean-Bethke Elshtain, The Just War Tradition and Natural Law, 28 Fordham
Int’l L. J. 642 (2004).
167. See Thomas H. Lee, The Augustinian Just War Tradition and the Problem of Pretext in Humanitarian
Intervention, 28 Fordham Int’l L. J. 756 (2005).
168. But see Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretexts for War, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 107,
107 (2006) (contending that legalizing unilateral humanitarian intervention would “discourage ulterior
motives for war).
169. See Official Statement of President Medvedev upon Invading South Ossetia (Aug. 8, 2008),
available at http://www.sras.org/statements_on_russia_georgia_conflict_2.
170. My disagreement with Evans’ view that r2p is fundamentally different from R2P is a basic
premise of this article.
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action against Georgia’s invasion, and by responding with disproportionate
force.171 Evans speculated that R2P might have been a pretext:
While one purpose of the Russian military intervention may have
been to protect South Ossetian civilians under attack, it is highly
questionable whether that was the primary motive: others appear
to have been to establish full Russian control over both South
Ossetia and Abkhazia (in the latter of which there was not even
claimed to be a threat of mass atrocity crimes); to dismantle Geor-
gia’s entire military capability; to scuttle its NATO ambitions;
and to send a clear signal to other former parts of the Soviet
Union as to what would and would not be tolerated by
Moscow.172
Another possible motive, which Evans did not mention, was Russia’s desire
to seek payback for the proto-R2P intervention by NATO against Serbia in
Kosovo, which Western European countries had recognized as a sovereign
state earlier that month.173
Regardless of whether it was because of a change of heart, a pragmatic
acceptance of the unlikelihood of securing support for armed humanitarian
interventions in a less hospitable geopolitical environment, or the risk of
pretext by powerful states, R2P had evolved into much more than a repack-
aging of humanitarian military intervention by early 2011.174 The 2005 to
2011 version of R2P was a policy agenda to recast state-building and de-
mocracy promotion in the less interventionist and non-normative framing of
“civilian protection.” Complementing and sometimes complicating this
function, the language of R2P constituted a vocabulary susceptible of at
least three different usages: it could be used as a clarion call or “hortatory
norm” both to troubled states to shape up and to other states to help
them;175 it could be “danger words” used by diplomats to signal a humani-
tarian crisis on the brink; or it could be a self-justificatory mantra uttered by
leaders of powerful states to disguise self-interested motives for military ac-
tion. What unified all of this diversity of opinion was the basic point of
R2P—undermining the exclusive sovereignty obstacle to outside involve-
ment in mass atrocities in foreign states.
171. See Gareth Evans, Georgia, Russia, and the Responsibility to Protect, 1 Amsterdam L. F. (2009),
available at http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/view/58/115.
172. Id.
173. See Clifford J. Levy, Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves, N. Y. Times, (Aug. 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/europe/27russia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
174. The history of the evolution of the R2P norm in international life, rhetoric, policymaking, and
law is itself an interesting case study in the interaction of ideational and material factors in international
politics.
175. See Burke-White, supra note 104. R
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C. R2P.2: The Arab Spring and the Return of Forcible R2P
The revival of armed force as R2P’s driving impetus was triggered by the
so-called Arab Spring of popular uprisings that rippled through North Af-
rica and Southwest Asia in early 2011. Long-lived dictators were forced out
by mass demonstrations in Tunisia (Ben Ali), Egypt (Mubarak, in round
one), and Yemen (Saleh). But their counterparts in Libya (Qaddafi), Syria
(Bashar al-Assad), and Bahrain (King Hamad al-Khalifa) did not give way to
popular demands for democratic reforms, opting instead to crack down on
the protesters with varying degrees of brutality. In the cases of Libya and
Syria, the result was prolonged civil war. In Bahrain, a smaller island na-
tion,176 intervention by Saudi Arabian troops and UAE security forces, cou-
pled with conciliatory measures by King Hamad (for example, a cash gift of
$1,000 to all Bahrainis and appointment of an independent commission to
investigate the government’s conduct during the uprising) led to a more
stable although still volatile situation.
1. Libya
It was the NATO bombing and robust enforcement of a no-fly zone in
Libya pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution that brought the mil-
itary face of R2P back into the limelight. In mid-February 2011, inspired
by popular uprisings in Tunisia, its neighbor to the west, and Egypt next
door in the east, opposition to the rule of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya mani-
fested itself in mass protests. The demonstrations turned violent—some
protesters threw rocks, fired guns, and tossed Molotov cocktails and gas
bombs. Qaddafi’s forces stood their ground, calling in gunfire support from
snipers and helicopters in some instances to disperse rioters. Scores of protes-
ters and some government troops were killed and wounded. The violence
176. Bahrain has about 1.3 million people, less than half of whom are Bahrani nationals. Three hun-
dred thousand are Indian-national laborers. CIA, Bahrain, in The World Factbook (2013), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/contributor_copyright.html. By con-
trast, Libya had a population of about 6 million, 98 percent of whom are Libyan nationals and Syria 22.5
million, almost all of whom are Syrian nationals. CIA, Libya, in The World Factbook (2013), available
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html; CIA, Syria, in The World
Factbook (2013), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.
Bahrain is also politically very close to the United Kingdom and the United States; the U.S. Fifth Fleet
has its headquarters there and Bahrain is the main base for U.S. military operations in the Middle East
region. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command: U.S. Fifth Fleet, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil (last
visited Mar. 29, 2014). Kuwait and Morocco, U.S. allies in the region, also had uprisings resulting in
moves toward democratic reform, without the eruption of large-scale civil conflicts. In Kuwait, protests
led to the resignation of Prime Minister Nasser Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah and the dissolution of
the Parliament. Fiona MacDonald, Kuwait Government Resigns Amid Growing Opposition Protests, Bus.
Week, (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-11-28/kuwait-government-resigns-
amid-growing-opposition-protests.html; J. David Goodman, Kuwaiti leader dissolves parliament, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/middleeast/kuwaiti-leader-dissolves-
parliament.html. In Morocco, protests led to political concessions by King Mohammed VI and a referen-
dum on constitutional reforms. Borzou Daragahi, Morocco’s King Proposes Constitutional Reforms, L.A.
Times, (June 18, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/18/world/la-fg-morocco-king-reforms-
20110618.
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escalated, and the riots turned into outright rebellion as government forces
and posts were overrun throughout the country, especially in the eastern and
central parts including the port city of Ras Lanuf, the principal pipeline
terminus for oil exports. But on March 7, 2011, Qaddafi’s forces launched a
counter-offensive that quickly overcame rebel opposition and re-established
control of most of the major cities including Ras Lanuf, with the important
exception of the rebel stronghold of Benghazi in the east. By March 16,
2011, Qaddafi’s ground forces were poised to retake Benghazi.177 It seemed
only a matter of time before Qaddafi would win the civil war and regain
control of the country by force of arms.
The next day, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1973. The
Resolution authorized the use of force by member states in Libya and thus
changed the course of the civil war and ultimately led to Qaddafi’s death
and regime change in Libya. Three things are noteworthy about Resolution
1973: (1) what it says about the process and substance of forcible R2P; (2) the
limitations it placed on military operations; and (3) the importance of buy-
in from other states in the region.
First, the Security Council adopted a resolution that explicitly invoked
R2P as the reason for authorizing the use of force. It was the first time the
U.N. Security Council had authorized a military intervention for humanita-
rian purposes since the abortive invasion of Haiti in 1995. In 1999, it was
fear of a Russian veto that had pushed NATO to intervene without trying
for Security Council preauthorization in Kosovo. And, during the Darfur
crisis, pro-intervention advocates (the United States under the Bush Admin-
istration was not one of them) did not press for a Security Council vote in
large part because of fear of a Chinese veto. Thus, the fact that Russia and
China abstained rather than vetoed the Libya R2P Resolution was a crucial
“process” victory for forcible R2P. One possible conclusion to be drawn
from the Libya case was clarification that Security Council preauthorization
was a necessary condition for forcible R2P, and that Kosovo was an unlawful
outlier.178
In terms of substance, the Resolution repeatedly referred to the responsi-
bility to protect civilians as the reason for authorizing forceful measures. The
Security Council expressed “grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the
escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties.”179 It underscored
177. Anthony Shadid & David Kirkpatrick, Libyan Rebels Defiant but in Disarray, as Qaddafi’s Forces
Gain Momentum, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/world/africa/12libya.
html?pagewanted=all; Sudarsan Raghaven, In Libya, Gaddafi’s Tanks Split Rebel Forces, Wash. Post,
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-libya-gaddafis-forces-mount-heavy-assault-
on-strategic-town/2011/03/15/ABDpckX_story.html.
178. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The United Nations Security Council and the Authorization of Force: Renewing
the Council Through Law Reform, in The Security Council and the Use of Force, Theory and
Reality—A Need for Change? 47, 55 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005) (asserting the
necessity of Security Council preauthorization for humanitarian intervention before Libya).
179. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 94, ¶ 3. R
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“its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian popu-
lated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance
and the safety of humanitarian personnel.”180 Resolution 1973 actually au-
thorized three military measures; two of these—inspections to enforce a
standing arms embargo and establishing a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace “in
order to protect civilians”181—were widely discussed and relatively uncon-
troversial. From a military perspective, however, a no-fly zone seemed a fee-
ble step given the then-precarious position of the rebels in Benghazi.
Furthermore, a no-fly zone would not have affected ground maneuver or
bombardment and would have been harder to enforce against low-flying ro-
tary-wing aircraft,182 which constituted Qaddafi’s strengths. Thus, at Amer-
ican insistence,183 the Security Council authorized a third, more open-ended
use of force to protect civilians. The key provision of the Resolution stated
that the Council:
Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-Gen-
eral . . . to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occu-
pation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.184
This passage showcased the second key aspect of the Security Council’s
Libya Resolution, namely, its constraints on the scope of authorized military
operations. Even if deemed operationally necessary to protect civilians, “a
foreign occupation force” was categorically excluded.185 And “all necessary
measures” were to be defensive: “to protect civilians and civilian populated
areas under threat of attack.” 186 Military force could not, it appeared, be used
to help the rebels counter-attack or to go on the offensive, or to work a
regime change by eliminating Qaddafi. Of course, the line was much harder
to enforce in practice than in theory. For instance, government tanks and
troops moving away from Benghazi might be targeted on the view that they
were regrouping, not retreating for good. Or, when Qaddafi agreed to a
180. Id. ¶ 30.  The resolution included an explicit exception for humanitarian flights (“[d]ecid[ing]
further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanita-
rian . . . ”).
181. Id. ¶ 29.
182. Qaddafi relied heavily on helicopter gunships for aerial fire support missions against protesters
and rebels. See, e.g., Damien McElroy, Libya protests: Colonel Muammar Gaddafi Turns Helicopter Gunships on
Own People, Telegraph, (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian
ocean/libya/8331117/Libya-protests-Colonel-Muammar-Gaddafi-turns-helicopter-gunships-on-own-peo-
ple.html.
183. Michael Lewis, Obama’s Way, Vanity Fair, Oct. 5, 2012, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/
politics/2012/10/michael-lewis-profile-barack-obama.
184. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 94, ¶ 8. R
185. Id. ¶ 27. This might plausibly be construed to exclude offensive ground forces, although not
necessarily small teams of military advisers or special operators for intelligence and air control support,
etc.
186. Id. (emphasis added).
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ceasefire, a widespread pattern of breaches might ground the conclusion that
there was never any serious intent to halt hostilities, permitting continued
bombing of government troops and equipment around Benghazi. Regard-
less, the intent of the Security Council’s R2P force authorization was not to
end the civil war between government and rebel armies but rather to ensure
that both sides did not cause unnecessary civilian deaths and suffering in
fighting the war. It is worth pointing out that the Resolution’s limitations
are not logically compelled by the R2P norm. For example, although Reso-
lution 1973 expressly ruled them out, foreign occupation armies have a long
history of serving a civilian protection mission after a prolonged conflict has
degraded peacetime governance institutions.
Third, the Security Council expressed special deference and solicitude for
neighboring countries and the regional organization of the League of Arab
States. Resolution 1973 “recognize[d] the important role of the League of
Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace
and security in the region.”187 The Security Council “request[ed] the mem-
ber states of the League of Arab States to co-operate with other member
states” in implementing the civilian-protection mission.188 The endorse-
ment of the Arab League was apparently a key reason why China and Russia
declined to veto the resolution. In explaining his abstention,189 China’s U.N.
representative stated for the record that China “had not blocked the passage
of the resolution . . . because it attached great importance to the requests of
the Arab League and the African Union.”190 The Russian ambassador ex-
pressed misgivings about the authorization of force for civilian protection,
and an alternative preference for a resolution requesting an immediate
ceasefire. He acknowledged, however, “that there was a need to avoid fur-
ther destabilization in the region.”191
When we examine closely how facts developed on the ground, it becomes
more difficult to assess what the Libya precedent means for forcible R2P in
the future, particularly with respect to the three enumerated themes of: (1) a
paradigm responsibility-to-protect civilians case in terms of procedure and
substance; (2) compliance with the proportionality limitations set by the
Security Council; and (3) the role and importance of regional states in opera-
tionalizing forcible R2P.
187. Id. ¶ 28.
188. Id.
189. By longstanding custom, an abstention is considered a “concurring vote,” not a veto, for pur-
poses of the voting requirement of U.N. Charter art. 27(3). See Voting System and Records, United Na-
tions Security Council, http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/voting.shtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2014);
Sydney D. Bailey, New Light on Abstentions in the UN Security Council, 50 Int’l Aff. 554, 571 (1974).
190. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authoriz-
ing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with Five Abstentions, U.N.
Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
191. Id.
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First, how are we to interpret the fact that the Security Council managed,
for the first time, to enact a resolution authorizing military intervention that
invoked R2P? Should we view it as a major win for globalism and a poten-
tial paradigm shift decentering the sovereign state in international law and
politics? One legal scholar, Catherine Powell, has called Libya “a multilat-
eral constitutional moment” potentially “facilitating a normative shift with
implications for the underpinnings of the multilateral system—specifically
here, the U.N. Charter.”192 Or should we be more realist and dismiss the
globalist rhetoric of R2P as window dressing for traditional sovereignty-
based calculations of national interests, most importantly on the part of the
United States? Another legal scholar, Saira Mohammed, has asserted that
“the decision of the United States to support intervention in Libya . . .
should be recognized for what it was: a decision defended primarily by the
national interest and only secondarily by a sense of responsibility.”193
The answer may lie somewhere in the middle: it was a real break from
past respect for exclusive sovereignty that the Security Council authorized a
military intervention in an unconsenting sovereign state to protect civilians,
but the authorization itself was a result of great-power politics. The two
crucial events that enabled the ten yes, five abstention Security Council vote
on Resolution 1973’s unprecedented civilian-protection force authorization
were: (1) American leadership and pressure on the other Security Council
members for something more than a no-fly zone or a ceasefire and (2) Rus-
sia’s and China’s decisions not to cast votes. As journalist Michael Lewis’s
account of President Obama’s decision-making reveals, there is evidence that
it was his strong personal desire to actually stop Qaddafi’s killing of civilians
which led Obama to insist on something more than the no-fly zone which
the Arab League and European allies were urging.194 And the prospect of
domestic political blowback because of the absence of congressional pre-ap-
proval and the prospect of losing a U.S. airman in a new military operation
with two ongoing wars was a very strong “national interest” factor pushing
in the opposite direction. Thus, although Mohammed may be correct that
U.S. national interests drove its support for Resolution 1973,195 it is also fair
to say that the R2P norm had succeeded in penetrating the decisionmaking
of the President of the United States196 to the extent of balancing out hefty
domestic and material reasons not to intervene in Libya.
192. Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 298, 303
(2012).
193. Saira Mohammed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 Stan. J. Int’l L. 319, 339
(2012).
194. See Lewis, supra note 183, at 5. R
195. See also Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2011).
196. Lewis’s article gives some clues as to how this happened. Lewis, supra note 183. Certainly, the R
presence of humanitarian intervention advocates in his inner circle like Samantha Power and Susan Rice
had something to do with it. But it is also likely President Obama’s military advisers told him that
Libya’s surface-to-air defense capabilities were limited (for instance, by comparison to Syria) and that the
military picture with rebels trapped in Benghazi, and a country with mostly desert and a few big cities,
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But what about the decisions by China and Russia to abstain? Here the
argument that R2P swayed decisions seems implausible. The evidence indi-
cates that for China and likely also for Russia, the support of the League of
Arab States for some use of force against Qaddafi was the crucial factor in
abstaining. Indeed, it was the League that had gone to the U.N. Security
Council requesting a no-fly zone in the first place.197 The League had sus-
pended Libya in February 2011 for its brutal response to protests, and of the
remaining 21 members, all but Algeria and Syria voted in favor of a no-fly
zone.198 The reality was that Libya, because of Qaddafi’s bizarre personality
and the fact that continuing his rule did not align with either Shiite or
Sunni Muslim interests, was a pariah in the Arab community even though
he had recently reconciled with the United States and Western Europe. Ac-
cordingly, China and Russia did not see any reason not to go with what the
Arab League wanted, which was some coercive action to stop Qaddafi from
killing too many civilians. From a geopolitical perspective, Qaddafi was iso-
lated low-lying fruit in charge of a major oil-producing country, and this
factor, more than President Obama’s humanitarian impulse and the R2P
war hawks in the U.S. State Department or the ideational norm pull of R2P,
may have accounted for why Resolution 1973 happened, at least in terms of
explaining China and Russia’s critical abstentions.199
What about the predicate offenses for R2P in Libya? There were two
plausible justifications: crimes against humanity and war crimes. Resolution
1973 pointed to crimes against humanity as a predicate: “the widespread
and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.”200
Although there was no documented massacre or mass execution of civilians,
there was justifiable fear of what Qaddafi would unleash on the residents of
Benghazi had he broken the rebel defenses. Moreover, the government’s se-
curity forces had fired into crowds, its tanks had rumbled forward and fired
their machine guns to disperse protesters, snipers and helicopter gunships
had fired from above at armed protesters they deemed violent or inflam-
matory. By the time the protests had gelled into a more organized rebellion,
government troops had killed scores of civilians along with fighters in their
was conducive to an accurate and effective aerial bombardment campaign. Cf. Graham T. Allison &
Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2d ed. 1999)
(demonstrating how an understanding of organizational process and bureaucratic politics helps to explain
the Kennedy Administration’s decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis).
197. Council of the League of Arab States, The Implications of the Current Events in Libya and the Arab
Position, ¶ 8, Min. Conf. Res. No. 7360 (Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/
Arab%20League%20Ministerial%20level%20statement%2012%20march%202011%20-%20english
(1).pdf.
198. Arab League Backs Libya No-fly Zone, B.B.C. News (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-12723554.
199. Cf. Aidan Hehir, The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to
Protect, 38 Int’l Sec. 137, 153–56 (2013).
200. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 94, ¶ 5. R
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counter-offensive to recover rebel-occupied towns and positions. War crimes
were likely committed: government forces were reported to have shelled and
bombed indiscriminately in civilian areas, enforced curfews in contested ar-
eas by shooting, and refused treatment of wounded rebels.201 Reliable esti-
mates indicate that more than 1,000 protesters and rebels were killed
between February 15 and March 16.202 Thus, even without factoring in a
prospective massacre in Benghazi, there was credible evidence of crimes
against humanity and war crimes.
But even if the facts did ground a plausible case for R2P under the rubrics
of crimes against humanity or war crimes, it had not yet ripened into the
same kind of mass atrocity or humanitarian crisis that the world witnessed
in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, or even Kosovo. The month-long crisis in
Libya from February to March 2011 was precipitated by a long-lived author-
itarian regime using lethal violence to crack down on a pro-democracy pop-
ular uprising. It was more like the Tiananmen Massacre in China in 1989
(400 to 2,600 estimated deaths) or the Kwangju Massacre in South Korea in
1980 (1,000 to 2,000 estimated deaths).203
In sum, even if as a descriptive matter, the Libya intervention was solidly
consistent with R2P theory in terms of process (Security Council
preauthorization) and formal substance (colorable claims of crimes against hu-
manity and possibly war crimes as predicate offenses), it was not a textbook
mass atrocity situation. Thus, the harder normative question going forward
is whether the Libya case means that R2P has evolved into a burgeoning
customary international law norm prohibiting the ruling regime of a state
from killing civilians who protest its rule. If so, then Libya is truly a revolu-
tionary precedent with far-reaching implications, to the effect that the world
community has a responsibility to intervene militarily against oppressive
regimes that kill civilians in cracking down on pro-democracy uprisings.
The problem with embracing this interpretation of the Libya events is
that it may be going too far too fast in decentering sovereignty. There are
many powerful countries that have relatively recently used lethal force to
crack down on prodemocracy or self-determination movements within their
201. Louis Charbonneau, Strong Proof of Libya Crimes Against Humanity: ICC, Reuters, May 2, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/02/us-libya-warcrimes-idUSTRE7417VU2011 0502; Nick Ca-
rey, Gaddafi War Crimes in Misrata Widespread: Report, Reuters, Aug. 30, 2011, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/08/30/us-libya-misrata-warcrimes-idUSTRE77T0J520110830.
202. Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria, 13 Melb. J. Int’l L. 1, 2
(2012).
203. Estimates of the number of people killed in the Tiananmen Square Massacre vary widely; how-
ever, it seems most plausible that a dozen or so policemen were killed along with 400 to 800 civilians.
Nicholas D. Kristof, A Reassessment of How Many Died in the Military Crackdown in Beijing, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/21/world/a-reassessment-of-how-many-died-in-the-
military-crackdown-in-beijing.html. Estimates place the number of casualties of the Kwangju Massacre
in South Korea anywhere from 200-2,000, with the most reliable estimates in the 1,000 to 2,000 deaths
range. Flashback: The Kwangju Massacre, B.B.C. News (May 17, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/752055.stm.
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borders—China and Russia for instance. Some of these countries, like
Bahrain and Egypt, are important U.S. allies. What virtually guarantees that
R2P will not be invoked in these cases is a procedural fact and a procedural
presumption. The procedural fact is that the five permanent members of the
Security Council—the so-called P5 countries (United States, United King-
dom, France, China, and Russia)—have a veto. The presumption is that
Security Council preauthorization is necessary for an R2P intervention.
Accordingly, a key but unforeseen negative consequence of counting the
factual predicate in Libya as a successful and lawful instance of forcible R2P
is pressure to conclude that Security Council preauthorization is an absolute
requirement for lawful humanitarian intervention. Otherwise, states could
use relatively low-level R2P violations by oppressive governments as a rea-
son to use armed force against them unilaterally, and there would be no way
to call them unlawful for lack of Security Council authorization. It is unsur-
prising, then, that R2P commentary has backed off the 2001 ICISS Report’s
suggestion of substitutes for Security Council preapproval. By contrast, the
party line uttered by most commentators in the last few years is that R2P
has not changed the bifocal orthodoxy of the U.N. Charter’s jus ad bellum
regime,204 with the possible exception of some ambiguous language in the
U.N. Secretary-General’s 2009 Report referencing the General Assembly’s
authority under its UFP resolution.205
When one thinks about these implications of the Libya precedent, the
way R2P played out in Libya may have set back rather than advanced the
cause of applying military force to the most severe humanitarian crises.206
R2P is about preventing civilian deaths in a humanitarian crisis, not pro-
democratic regime change. The point is often obscured because in reality a
long-term solution to a humanitarian crisis will often require regime
change.
The way to resolve this tension is to distinguish between what U.N. Se-
curity Council Resolution 1973 expressly authorized and what the United
States-led intervention in Libya actually did. The resolution had specified
204. “Only the Security Council can authorize the use of force, under Chapter VII, Article 42, of the
Charter.” U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012). “In this context, we are prepared to
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity.” 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005).
205. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 92.
206. Indeed, one political scientist has gone so far as to argue that the military intervention ended up
aggravating and not ameliorating the humanitarian situation in Libya. Alan Kuperman has asserted that
if the United States had not started its bombing campaign when it did, Qaddafi’s forces would have
promptly retaken Benghazi and reestablished control, saving thousands of lives by cutting the civil war
short by several months. See Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention? Reassessing NATO’s
Libya Campaign, 38 Int’l Sec. 105 (2013).
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that force was authorized to protect civilians only when they were “under
threat of attack.”207 The Arab League, dominated by Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
and other autocratic oil-rich U.S. allies, had initially wanted just a no-fly
zone. The intent of the Resolution, and the reason for the Arab League’s
support of it, was that military intervention was to stop beleaguered auto-
crats (like Qaddafi in Libya but also consider King Hamad Al-Khalifa in
Bahrain) from inhumanely killing civilians to stamp out democratic mass
protests and armed rebellions against their rule, not to help the rebels win.
The Resolution was supported by the Arab League and not vetoed by China
and Russia precisely because it was perceived to be regime-change
neutral.208
As things turned out, however, the NATO bombing of government forces
continued when the rebels went on the offensive. News reports indicate that
NATO warplanes gave close-air support to rebel ground operations, and
that U.S. intelligence was used to help rebel forces hunt and kill Qaddafi
and his key supporters.209 Unsurprisingly, China and Russia objected that
the United States and NATO were acting beyond the scope of Resolution
1973 and therefore in violation of international law.210 It is doubtful that
China and Russia would have abstained from a Security Council resolution
authorizing forcible R2P measures up to and including regime change. Be-
cause the United States and NATO did not have an alternative legal basis
for their continuing military operations in support of the Libyan rebels—
NATO could not plausibly claim self-defense in North Africa and the doc-
207. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 94, ¶ 4. R
208. As I wrote at the time:
Now that initial air strikes to disable Qaddafi’s systemic air-defense capabilities have been
concluded, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France should stay within the bounds
of the two explicit missions of protecting civilians and enforcing the no-fly zone set forth in
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973. This means that military operations to “take out”
Qaddafi or topple his government and to engage in close air . . . support of rebel forces
advancing against Qaddafi’s forces . . . (as opposed to rebel forces defending civilian population
centers) should be foreclosed. Rebel forces engaged in combat are not themselves civilians
under the customary law of war, and, accordingly, there is no mandate in the S.C. resolution to
help them win a civil war. In other words, the United States and its allies should make a good-
faith attempt to make sure that military intervention is limited to the explicit terms of the
Security Council resolution, despite a lack of assurances that there will be regime change in
Libya or that Libya will continue to exist as one country.
Thomas H. Lee, Following International Law Helps the US in Libya, Huffington Post (Mar. 29, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-h-lee/following-international-l_b_841890.html.
209. Xan Rice, NATO Warplanes Bombard Tripoli After Gaddafi Vows Fight to the Death: Coalition Forces
Carry out Attacks Within Hours of Libyan Leader’s Defiant Television Speech, The Guardian, June 8, 2011,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/08/nato-strikes-tripoli-gaddafi-speech; NATO Forces Help-
ing Rebels in Hunt, The Independent, Aug. 25, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/af-
rica/nato-forces-helping-rebels-in-hunt-for-gaddafi-2343689.html.
210. Patrick Goodenough, Russia, China Accuse West of Exceeding UN Resolution, Making Libyan Crisis
Worse, CNS News (Mar. 29, 2011), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/russia-china-accuse-west-exceeding-
un-resolution-making-libyan-crisis-worse.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\55-2\HLI201.txt unknown Seq: 52 18-JUL-14 15:34
302 Harvard International Law Journal / Vol. 55
trine of invitation was not in play given the disorganized state of the rebel-
lion at the time—the assertion of ultra vires illegality is not without merit.
Whether the United States and its NATO allies violated the international
law of war by exceeding the Security Council’s mandate in Libya is a serious
legal question,211 but the more important practical question for the purposes
of this Article is what the allegation means for the future of R2P.212 One
reasonable lesson to be inferred from the course of events in Libya was that
putting limitations into a Security Council authorization of forcible R2P
against an autocratic government was a pointless exercise. Once R2P pro-
vides cover for a military intervention by the United States and other power-
ful democracies, it is unlikely that the interveners will stop when the short-
term humanitarian crisis is over, or more generally that they will be neutral
between the two sides to the civil war that generated the crisis. Knowing
this, any state reflexively concerned about regime change will never allow
forcible R2P again, including states that may be veto-holding permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council. If this prediction is correct, then
what happened with R2P in Libya was a serious setback to the cause of
globalism and human rights not because more lives were lost in Libya than
if an intervention had not occurred as Kuperman has argued, but because
NATO’s conduct in Libya virtually ensured that a Security Council resolu-
tion authorizing forcible R2P against an autocratic regime would never hap-
pen again barring significant regime change in China and Russia or a
procedural reform of Security Council voting rules to eliminate the veto.
Neither event seems likely in the foreseeable future.
2. Syria
This newfound reluctance of the Security Council to authorize forcible
R2P is a fairly accurate account of what has been going on in Syria. As in
Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya, popular demonstrations against Bashar
al-Assad’s government started in late February 2011. Facially conciliatory
measures gave way to coercion, as al-Assad deployed his army to control
protests that were proliferating around the country. As Spencer Zifcak has
meticulously detailed, the level of violence ratcheted up severely over the
next several months.213 The protesters shifted from demands for reform to
outright regime change. The army and paramilitary militias counter-shifted
to using armed force first, not as a last resort, and without regard for the
presence of unarmed civilians. Armed rebels, for their part, attacked not
only government forces but also suspected sympathizers and Alawite Shiites,
members of al-Assad’s minority sect of Islam. Thousands were arrested; hun-
dreds of thousands fled the violence. The Security Council met throughout
211. See Eric A. Posner, Outside the Law, Foreign Pol’y, Oct. 25, 2011, available at http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/25/libya_international_law_qaddafi_nato?page=full.
212. See Zifcak, supra note 202. R
213. See id. at 14–23.
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to discuss the situation but without passing any definitive measures. Zifcak
relates developments on the eve of a crucial Security Council meeting in
early 2012 to vote on a resolution for decisive action in Syria:
The vote on the resolution was scheduled for 4 February [2012].
On the evening of 3 February, the Syrian authorities launched the
first of many rocket attacks upon the city of Homs. Rebel-held
suburbs of the city were shelled relentlessly without regard for
any distinction between rebel fighters and civilians. At least 210
people were killed and hundreds more were wounded in one
weekend of shelling. It was the bloodiest weekend of violence in
the 11 months since the uprising began. The total number of
Syrian people killed climbed past 6000.214
Thirteen of the fifteen members of the Security Council voted in favor of
the proposed resolution under consideration at the February 4, 2012, meet-
ing, but it failed because the other two members—China and Russia—ve-
toed it. What is most remarkable about the result is that the double veto
was cast to abort a toothless resolution that did not come close to authoriz-
ing the use of force. The resolution condemned the violence and civilian
deaths and called upon the Syrian government to stop using its military to
clamp down on popular protests, to allow access to humanitarian assistance
and Arab League monitors, and to undertake reforms to open up the politi-
cal process to greater participation.215 The proposed Security Council resolu-
tion did not authorize any of the forms of military force in Resolution
1973—interdiction to enforce an arms embargo (Russia was still openly
supplying arms to al-Assad) or a no-fly zone, much less a free-ranging R2P
defense mission. In fact, it expressly stated that nothing in the resolution
authorized any coercive measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
What likely motivated China’s and Russia’s vetoes was the possibility
that any Security Council resolution might end up facilitating regime
change like Resolution 1973 did in Libya. The minutes of the meeting re-
cord the Russian representative as having stated for the record that while
Russia “was committed to finding a solution to the crisis, some influential
members of the international community had been undermining the possi-
bility of a peaceful settlement by advocating a change of regime.”216 The
Chinese representative emphasized that Syria’s “sovereignty, independence,
and territorial integrity must be respected.”217 While the proposed resolu-
tion might have been a paper tiger, in the view of both China and Russia it
could have set the stage for subsequent more forceful measures.
214. Id. at 25.
215. See S.C. Res. 77, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).
216. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria as
Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s Proposed Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release
SC/10536 (Feb. 4, 2012).
217. Id.
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Tensions further escalated after reports of the Syrian government’s use of
chemical weapons against civilians came to light. On June 13, 2013, the
United States reported definitive evidence that Syrian government forces
had used chemical weapons against rebels on a number of occasions, with an
estimated 100 to 150 fatalities.218 Two months later, the United States re-
ported evidence that Syrian government forces had used nerve agents against
civilian areas in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013, with an esti-
mated 1,429 fatalities, 426 of which were children.219 Approximately 3,600
patients reached Damascus hospitals in the three hours following the attack
displaying symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure.220 In the follow-
ing weeks, the Obama Administration planned a military strike to deter
future chemical weapons usage.221 The combination of a Russia-proposed
compromise and the strong possibility that such military action would not
receive congressional approval led the administration to focus instead on
diplomatic efforts.222
The Russian-U.S. compromise resulted in the unanimously approved Se-
curity Council Resolution 2118 (2013) ordering Syria to destroy its chemi-
cal weapons stockpile and dismantle its capabilities to produce them by
mid-2014.223 While the resolution mentions the August 21 attacks, it falls
far short of even holding the Syrian government responsible.224 To date,
while the Syrian government seems to be cooperating with the resolution,
American officials have expressed concern that Syria has identified only
twenty-three of the forty-five suspected chemical weapons sites.225
By October 2013, the death toll in more than two years of civil war in
Syria had surpassed 100,000 lives, many of them civilians.226 Hundreds of
thousands fled the country; millions have been displaced. There have been at
least three documented massacres committed by government-controlled mi-
litias, with civilians and prisoners killed execution-style with hands bound
behind their backs with plastic ties. The government has continued its in-
218. Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon & Mark Landler, U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian
Rebels, N. Y. Times, June 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemi-
cal-weapons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
219. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian Govern-
ment’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013 (Aug. 30, 2013), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-
weapons-august-21.
220. Id.
221. Mark Landler & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-arsenal.
html?_r=0.
222. Id.
223. S.C. Res. 2118, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
224. Id. at 1–2.
225. Nick Cumming-Bruce & Michael R. Gordon, Syria Meets Deadline for Submitting Destruction Plan
for Chemical Weapons, N. Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/world/mid-
dleeast/syria-meets-deadline-for-arms-destruction-plan.html?_r=0.
226. Erika Solomon, Syria Death Toll Hits Nearly 126,000: Monitoring Groups, Reuters, Dec. 2, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/02/us-syria-crisis-toll-idUSBRE9B10ES20131202.
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discriminate shelling of rebel-held towns and positions with a fury that sug-
gests intent to terrorize any and all residents, not a desire for discrete
military advantage.227 Most importantly, the Syrian government’s chemical
attacks on both rebel forces and civilians—attacks that the Security Council
decried as a “serious violation of international law”228—caused approxi-
mately 1,600 fatalities.229
Despite the ongoing tragedy of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the
United States and the rest of the world are reluctant to use armed force to
resolve it230 given a negotiated settlement of the chemical-weapons issue.
But what if a negotiated deal had not presented itself, or what if Syria ulti-
mately fails to comply with reasonable disarmament and verification mea-
sures? Would it be lawful under international law for the United States to
intervene militarily without Security Council approval? Harold Hongju
Koh, former Legal Adviser to the U.S. State Department, has asserted the
legality of such action;231 others have vociferously countered his claim. In
Koh’s view, since Kosovo, “international law has evolved sufficiently to per-
mit morally legitimate action to prevent atrocities by responding to the
deliberate use of chemical weapons.”232 A large part of that evolution was
due to the creation and norm pull of R2P as described above. What is miss-
ing in Koh’s account is a lawyerly solution that draws from past cases to
articulate a customary international law doctrine that can constrain the
countervailing potential that a right of humanitarian intervention might be
abused, as some might assert was the case in Libya when a limited R2P
mission was expanded to the aim of regime change. The challenge is to
design the doctrinal architecture of forcible R2P in such a way that it con-
strains pretexts while permitting military interventions in extreme cases
where the Security Council is deadlocked by one or more vetoes.
The next Part of this Article argues that this can be done by borrowing
from r2p doctrine to shape R2P doctrine consistently with past state prac-
tice, and more fundamentally, by integrating the two into one customary
international law doctrine of jus ad bellum. Perhaps what U.N. Security
Council deadlock in Syria shows is that despite the hope engendered by
227. See Human Rights Watch Safe No More: Students and Schools under Attack in
Syria (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0613webwcover.pdf.
228. S.C. Res. 2118, supra note 223, at 1–2. R
229. Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon & Mark Landler, U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian
Rebels, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/world/middleeast/syria-chemi-
cal-weapons.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
230. Of the NATO countries, only Turkey has intervened militarily, and it has a unique interest and
plausible self-defense justification owing to refugee flows and instability along its long border with Syria.
231. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention Part II:
International Law and the Way Forward, Just Security (Oct. 2, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/
02/koh-syria-part2; Kevin Jon Heller, Four Thoughts on Koh’s Defence of Unilateral Humanitarian Interven-
tion, Opinio Juris (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:26  PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/02/four-thoughts-kohs-de-
fence-unilateral-humanitarian-intervention; David Kaye, Guest Post: Harold Koh’s Case for Humanitarian
Intervention, Just Security (Oct. 7, 2013), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/07/kaye-kohs-case.
232. Koh, supra note 231. R
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Libya, it may be premature to see R2P as a freestanding norm of conduct in
international affairs given its amorphous quality and the threat it poses to
traditional notions of sovereignty dear to key great-power states. Whatever
the drawbacks of the principle of exclusive sovereignty, its basic idea that
what goes inside a state is its own business and nobody else’s remains an
extremely powerful one today. Given this practical reality, the better course
may be a more modest one: to see the homology between r2p and R2P, to
sharpen a unitary customary international law doctrine in light of the
problems illuminated by the homology, and to use the more focused and
modest doctrine as a means for legal authorization of humanitarian interven-
tion with Security Council authorization in only the most serious cases, re-
gardless of nationality.
IV. An Integrated Responsibility to Protect Civilians
Parts II and III detailed the origins and evolution of the customary inter-
national law right to protect civilians (r2p) and the new norm of the respon-
sibility to protect civilians (R2P), respectively. To summarize, r2p is a
centuries-old international law right to use armed force abroad to protect
one’s own civilians or those of third-country allies. It was essential to the
promotion of trade and commerce across borders but is no longer as impor-
tant for those purposes. R2P is a cluster of norms of much more recent
vintage, born and shaped in the past couple decades. One thread in the R2P
cluster—forcible R2P—concerns the responsibility of other states to use
armed force to protect civilians who are endangered by their state. The
emergence of forcible R2P has revised existing customary law-of-war doc-
trine by eliminating nationality as both the reason for feeling responsible for
the fate of civilians in a foreign land and a condition precedent to the use of
armed force to protect them.
Pretext is a problem for both r2p and R2P. It is a problem for r2p because
powerful states have nationals spread throughout the world and can easily
plead danger to them as a reason for using armed force, when the real reason
is to gain or recover territory or otherwise assert national interests by force.
And pretext is the reason why many fear relaxing the Security Council ap-
proval requirement for forcible R2P. What is needed is a reformulation of
the customary international law doctrine of unilateral humanitarian inter-
vention to limit its applicability to the most serious cases, to encourage
states to exhaust other measures, to act multilaterally, if possible, and to
narrowly tailor the use of armed force to the civilian protection mission.
A. Forcible R2P as Workable Jus ad Bellum
The preceding history of R2P has demonstrated that the requirement of
U.N. Security Council authorization for military interventions presents a
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formidable obstacle to forcible R2P even in instances like Syria that present
severe humanitarian crises. But, as the ICISS Report intimated, nowhere is it
written in stone that U.N. Security Council authorization is an indefeasible
legal precondition for humanitarian intervention. But how should we deter-
mine when forcible R2P does not require Security Council authorization? Is
it not required for all mass atrocities? Or only the most severe mass atroci-
ties? If the latter, how is one to draw the line between cases that require
Security Council authorization and cases that do not?
The solution to this dilemma builds upon extrapolation from lawful in-
stances of r2p. Once again, Entebbe is the paradigm example. What made
the case for Israeli military intervention so compelling was the fact that the
civilians in question were: (1) targeted for death (2) because of their group
affiliation, whether Israeli nationality or Jewish faith. That is to say, for the
pro-Palestine terrorists, the lives of the involuntary hostages had no intrinsic
value as the lives of co-equal human beings. What mattered was their group
identity; what the terrorists threatened and were on the verge of doing was
exterminating them because of their group affiliation.
By the same token, in the forcible R2P context, the worst mass atrocity is
group extermination. When a government sniper scores a successful kill shot
on a protester, the resulting death was a function of the implicit belief that
the protester posed a specific danger. When state police interrogate a sus-
pected political dissident by torturing her and in so doing cause her death,
the death came about because the state believed the dissident to be a threat.
When civilians are killed by an artillery strike on a refugee compound be-
cause the shooters believe that enemy combatants have taken shelter in the
compound, they have been negligently killed in an attempt to accomplish
an imminent military objective. But some mass atrocities like the Nazi ge-
nocide of Jews, the Srebrenica massacre, or the use of atomic, biological, or
chemical weapons in a heavily civilian area with minor military objectives,
demonstrate intent to exterminate a particular ethnic, racial, or religious
group without regard for the individuality of the persons killed. For a sover-
eign state, entrusted as it is with the responsibility to protect its people, to
do such a thing is the most direct violation of its responsibility—not only is
the state intentionally violating its duty to protect civilians, it is implicitly
denying their individual humanity. This sort of group extermination is the
very worst sort of mass atrocity.
The upshot of this analysis is that R2P theory is overbroad insofar as it
treats the four predicate offenses of genocide, crimes against humanity, eth-
nic cleansing, and war crimes as equivalent for purposes of forcible R2P. The
point is best brought home by analogy to the architecture of deadly state
sanctions as against individuals for violent domestic crimes. The authorization
of the death penalty for the most heinous domestic crimes is not unlike the
authorization of deadly force via forcible R2P as against sovereign states for
serious international law violations: underlying both authorizations is the
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principle that the worst violations merit a 180-degree reversal of the state’s
basic responsibility to protect human lives, so that future lives might be
saved.233 The majority of countries with the death penalty sharply constrain
the predicate offenses to which it may be applied, usually to crimes against
the country like treason, terrorism (even non-lethal), and espionage, and, as
to the ordinary crime of murder.234 Indeed, in many advanced industrial
countries, capital punishment is only administered in particularly heinous
murder cases such as those involving the killing of multiple persons, preg-
nant women, or children.235
Human rights advocates are more expansive about the predicate offenses
for R2P military interventions, which are culled in a common law fashion
from documented abuses in the post-World War era, especially those in
Bosnia and Kosovo. Unlike rights-favoring progressives in domestic crimi-
nal law, rights-favoring progressives in international law want to criminalize
as much as possible because they want to create law where there is none. The
resultant, expansive list of forcible R2P predicate offenses contains the four
aforementioned categories of mass atrocities: genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.236
Genocide is the most serious of these, and no one doubts that it should be
a predicate offense to R2P military intervention. It is defined in the Geno-
cide Convention as killing, seriously injuring, or deliberately inflicting con-
ditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of any
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or preventing births or separating
the children of the group “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part” the
group “as such.”237 One hundred and forty-two countries have ratified the
Genocide Convention.238
“Crimes against humanity” encompass a systemic pattern or policy of
severe oppression of a civilian population. Although there is no treaty like
the Genocide Convention defining such crimes and binding states to refrain
233. The analogy is a rough one, because in the domestic criminal context, the death penalty is
applied after prosecution and sentencing.
234. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding 5-4 that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the death penalty for child rape); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty for rape of a woman).
235. For example, although both Japan and South Korea have statutes authorizing capital punish-
ment, the practice in both countries is to restrict the death penalty in individual crimes to those that are
most heinous and result in the victim’s death. The Death Penalty in Japan: A Report on Japan’s Legal
Obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and an Assessment of Public Attitudes to
Capital Punishment, Death Penalty Project (Mar. 2013), http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/DPP-Japan-report.pdf; Park Si-soo, Minister Hints at Resuming Death Row Execu-
tions, Korea Times (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/03/113_
62499.html.
236. See, e.g., ICISS Report, supra note 1, at 33. R
237. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
238. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, ICRC,
(May 14, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_
NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=357.
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from them, the category of crimes against humanity has been elucidated in
international criminal law, most importantly in the Rome Statute and in
prosecutions at the International Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda as Leila Sadat has thoroughly described.239 The key theme of crimes
against humanity is that they are systematic— either an affirmative part of
government policy or so widespread and open that we can presume state
acquiescence.240 Genocide, although separately codified, is conceptually
speaking also a crime against humanity, the worst imaginable; it is the state
seeking to exterminate a particular group of people within its jurisdiction.
Other characteristic crimes against humanity include governmental pro-
grams of non-judicial killings, disappearances, torture, imprisonment, rape,
religious persecution, and large-scale denials of civil and political rights.
Enslavement and apartheid—the systematic subordination of ethnic groups
within the population—are also crimes against humanity.
Ethnic cleansing, although it is commonly listed as a separate predicate
offense in R2P literature, is analytically a crime against humanity. It is fu-
eled by the same desire for ethnic purity as genocide, but without the delib-
erate intent to kill to achieve the end.241 The term was developed in the
early 1990s in reference to Serbian efforts to deport or displace by intimida-
tion other ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia.242 The criminalization of
ethnic cleansing, like the label, is of relatively recent vintage. But the con-
duct itself has a long pedigree, for instance in the global displacement of
indigenous groups by Western and Westernized nation-states in the eight-
eenth through early twentieth centuries.243 During that time, many consid-
ered such ethnic cleansing morally reprehensible but lawful, even as
genocide and war crimes came to be perceived as violations of international
law.
We can crystallize our discussion of predicate offenses so far by catego-
rizing the different sorts of offenses that fall within the concept of “crimes
against humanity.” The general category may be divided into lethal and
non-lethal crimes against humanity. Non-lethal crimes include ethnic
cleansing, which is now separately enumerated in public international law
239. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 334
(2013); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A ¶ 98 (June 12, 2002) (determining
that for a crime against humanity, “proof that the attack was directed against a civilian population and
that it was widespread or systematic, are legal elements of the crime”); Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes
Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 43, 47–49 (1999).
240. A controversial issue with respect to individual, not state, responsibility for crimes against hu-
manity in whether the offense may be chargeable to actors who engage in systemic oppression of popula-
tions but are not acting on behalf of states or “quasi-state-like organizations.” See Sadat, supra note 239, R
at 336. That issue is interesting but inapposite to our discussion of crimes against humanity as a predi-
cate offense enabling R2P military intervention, which presumes that agents of the target state are the
perpetrators.
241. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 2, at 12–13. R
242. See, e.g., Clotilde Pegorier, Ethnic Cleansing: A Legal Qualification 1–12 (2013).
243. See generally, e.g., Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on
the Frontier (2005).
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commentary, as well as apartheid, enslavement, and other systemic infringe-
ments (usually state-sponsored) of individual rights by non-lethal violence
(for example, rape, torture, and harsh confinement) or extreme discrimina-
tion short of apartheid. Lethal crimes, which comprise state policies of sys-
temic killings, can be further subdivided for the purposes of this article. The
most serious lethal crimes against humanity involve those in which the state
systematically kills groups of unarmed civilians or noncombatants. This sub-
category includes genocide, which is separately codified and enumerated in
public international law literature, but also offenses that I will refer to as
massacres. By “massacre” I mean the intentional and organized killing of a
group of civilians or unarmed prisoners without any pretense to killing for
the purposes of law enforcement or state security. This definition is meant to
distinguish a more prevalent subcategory of lethal crimes against humanity
in which the state or organization undertaking systemic killing does offer
such justifications, whether explicitly (for example, killing protesters or po-
litical prisoners after show trials) or implicitly (for example, disappearances
of dissidents). Massacres are usually explosive events of the sort we identify
as “mass atrocities,” whereas non-massacre lethal crimes against humanity
are typically state policies or campaigns that target individuals over longer
periods of time.
A sovereign state may commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing in peacetime, but such mass atrocities most often occur
during wars. The dehumanizing face of war fuels violence and resentments
suppressed during peace. Moreover, war supplies opportunities and pretexts
for violence and persecution of political opponents, traditional enemies, and
rivals. The confusion and chaos of hostilities also increase the chance that
atrocities will not be detected or key evidence destroyed. Nevertheless, there
is an important conceptual divide between genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and ethnic cleansing in the wartime context on the one hand, and war
crimes as the concept is invoked in R2P on the other. War crimes can only
occur during an armed conflict, and they are the results or byproducts of
fighting.
Policymakers and commentators usually define the war crimes that con-
stitute a predicate offense for R2P as “serious” or “grave”244 breaches of the
law of war, by which is meant how a war is fought or the “law in war” (jus
in bello).245 Jus in bello is mostly codified today in the Hague and Geneva
244. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“London Charter”) art. 6, Aug. 8,
1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(a), July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949”) and (b) (“other serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict”). Cf. S.C. Res. 955, annex, art.
1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 1–2 U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1 (1993).
245. There are jus ad bellum war crimes too, namely, planning or conspiring a war of aggression.
Such charges were among those made at Nuremberg albeit unsuccessfully. Some have accused American
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Conventions, but custom is still an important source of rules.246 Vague
words such as “serious” and “grave” are prone to subjective interpretation,
and they may fairly be construed to refer to either the quantity or quality of
breaches. Nevertheless, there are some commonly cited examples of war
crimes: (1) killing prisoners of war or fighters trying to surrender;247 (2)
forcing enemy civilians or soldiers to perform hard labor without pay like
slaves or torturing them for information;248 (3) using prohibited nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons;249 and (4) indiscriminate killing of civil-
ians and destruction of civilian targets,250 for instance by shelling cities or
destroying dams to cause flooding of inhabited or arable areas.251
A practical circumstance that distinguishes war crimes from the other
three predicate offenses is that they may be charged to powerful advanced
democracies like the United States and not just autocratic, troubled, or
failed states. It is rare to hear allegations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or
crimes against humanity committed by the United States or Western Euro-
pean countries today. But even the most sophisticated professional army of a
rights-protective state may commit war crimes given the chaotic nature and
stresses of armed conflict. This was a main reason why the United States did
not sign on to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court.252 For instance, the U.S. policy of “enhanced interrogation tech-
niques” for unlawful enemy combatants captured in the Afghanistan and
and British leaders who engineered the Second Iraq War of fomenting a war of aggression, particularly in
light of the pathetic evidence of weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) discovered during the war.
WMD was of course the principal legal, moral, and political justification offered by the United States.
246. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (O’Connor, J.) (citing customary law as
one of many factors when considering the bounds of the legality of detaining enemy combatants during
the duration of hostilities).
247. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(d), Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Regulations concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land art. 23(c), annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
248. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 247, arts. 51–53; Geneva Convention Relative to the R
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Hague Convention, supra note 247, art. 44. R
249. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 105
(July 8); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriolog-
ical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 22 U.S.C. 75, 1015
U.N.T.S 163.
250. Hague Convention, supra note 247, art. 23, 25 (codifying a largely customary standard). R
251. Air bombing with the principal aim of “breaking the morale and fighting spirit of the civilian
population” was widely practiced by both sides in World War II and was viewed as consistent with the
relevant customs of war at the time. Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 199–205 (1994). But
see Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare (1923), art. 22, 24, available at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/
The_Hague_Rules_of_Air_Warfare. The present view is that such bombings are unlawful by operation
of customs against intentional attacks against civilians and civilian objects, which are manifested in the
1997 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions arts. 48–60. See, e.g., Dep’t of Def., Conduct
of the Persian Gulf War, Interim Report to Congress (July 1991), 12-2, 12-4, available at http:/
/www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/PersianGulfWar/305.pdf.
252. See Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at
the International Criminal Court, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 510, 516 (2003); Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the
International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y. City L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (2005); Megan E. Lantto, Note, The United
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Iraq wars may reasonably be viewed as torture—a serious violation of the
law of war.253
To be sure, the majority of war crimes are likely to be committed by
armies that lack the professionalism and discipline of the U.S. military, or
by rebels fighting government forces. Examples of such war crimes are: (1)
fighters who do not wear uniforms or insignia to distinguish them from
civilians;254 (2) widespread use of civilians or civilian places and buildings
like temples, schools, hospitals, or refugee camps as shields;255 or (3) re-
peated use of crude weapons like improvised explosive devices in ways and
places that indiscriminately kill fighters and civilians alike.256 The common
thread of today’s generic war crimes is a disproportionately high rate of ci-
vilian or noncombatant deaths during an internal war in an autocratic, di-
vided, or failed state. When the disproportion is shockingly high, regardless
of whether the belligerent is a state or a rebel force, one might infer that the
underlying intent is to kill as many people as possible, regardless of whether
they are fighters or not. And, when it is the state engaging in such deliber-
ate and systematic wholesale killing, it would be a lethal crime against hu-
manity as well as a war crime.257
A state fighting a war in its territory cannot protect civilians within its
borders as effectively as it can in peace. The logical consequence of this is
that the state’s responsibility to protect civilians, although implicated, is not
as strong as it would be in the case of a predicate offense committed in
peacetime. If so, then the R2P rationale does not, and should not, generate
as strong a case for military intervention on the basis of evidence of war
crimes alone, as it would if the war crimes constitute genocide or some other
lethal crimes against humanity. It is worth pointing out that raising the bar
for when state responsibility for war crimes might enable a military inter-
vention under the R2P rationale does not mean rejecting individual respon-
sibility for them. On the contrary, international or national tribunals after
the fact have traditionally been, and will likely continue to be, the most
efficacious means of punishing and deterring war crimes.258 It is the idea
that war crimes are and should be equal to genocide as a predicate offense for
outside military intervention that is problematic.
States and the International Criminal Court: A Permanent Divide?, 31 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 619,
636 (2008).
253. See Torture Papers (Karen J. Greenberg et al. eds., 2005).
254. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 247, art. 4. R
255. Id. art. 23; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 248, art. 28. R
256. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as
amended on 3 May 1996 (1996 Amended Protocol II) art. 3, May 3, 1996, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.I/16
(Part I) (entered into force Dec. 3, 1998).
257. It would not be a massacre since the fact of war suggests a state security justification unless there
is not even a plausible military objective for the operations that resulted in the killings.
258. See generally Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of
International Criminal Law (2011).
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Similarly, when the state has violated its responsibility to protect civilians
by ethnic cleansing alone, it does not present as compelling a case for mili-
tary intervention as lethal violations of R2P. It should, accordingly, be sub-
ject to tougher evidentiary standards or process constraints before forcible
intervention is authorized. This is not meant to deny that ethnic cleansing is
at present a violation of international law, nor that it is morally reprehensi-
ble. But on the theory of R2P, if a sovereign state is trying to force people to
leave their homes in order to create homogenous enclaves but does not want
to kill the people it is forcing to leave, then it seems natural to think more
carefully about whether other countries should commit deadly force to stop
it.
To sum up, international leaders and human rights advocates formulate
R2P in the broadest terms possible. For them, the responsibility to protect
civilians is a holistic framework with many cross-cutting ends, ranging from
inculcating a respect for human life among the leaders of troubled sovereign
states, to persuading leaders and people of powerful states to feel responsible
for at-risk lives in troubled states, even to the point of fighting to protect
them if necessary. With these ends in mind, the literature focuses on four
predicate offenses that it treats as equally serious violations of R2P warrant-
ing forcible intervention as a last resort. However, they are not the same
either in terms of the theory of R2P or of the quantum of justification to use
deadly force to stop them.
The prescription to be drawn from this conclusion may be that there
should be stricter scrutiny for the lawful use of armed force where the impli-
cated mass atrocities are strictly war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or non-massa-
cre lethal crimes against humanity, or non-lethal crimes against humanity
like apartheid. Strict scrutiny might be operationalized by requiring U.N.
Security Council preauthorization prior to military intervention.259 Addi-
tionally, or alternatively, stricter evidentiary standards might be applied for
military interventions on the basis of these offenses. And states are, of
course, free to take non-forcible measures unilaterally, such as breaking off
diplomatic relations and economic sanctions. By the same token, forcible
R2P in the face of group-extermination atrocities should not necessarily be
undertaken unilaterally. A multilateral process involving prior resort to the
Security Council and coordination with regional states and organizations is
still good policy and perhaps even compelled as a matter of customary inter-
national law.
A sensible way to organize these instincts may be to divide forcible R2P
interventions into two different procedural tracks depending on the predi-
cate offenses at issue. Track-one cases involving clear and convincing evi-
dence of genocide, massacre crimes against humanity, or the lethal use of
259. I am talking prescriptively here, not descriptively. For example, the historical case of Kosovo in
1999 is inconsistent with the prescription.
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weapons of mass destruction against civilians would not require U.N. Secur-
ity Council preauthorization for military interventions. At the same time,
multilateral initiatives such as bringing the matter up before the Security
Council, acting through the General Assembly’s UFP procedure or through
regional organizations should be attempted before resort to unilateral force.
Track-two cases involving credible evidence of war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
the possession or non-lethal use of weapons of mass destruction, non-lethal
crimes against humanity, or lethal crimes against humanity short of massa-
cre would require U.N. Security Council preauthorization. The two-track
framework is illustrated in Figure 2 below (darker-shaded boxes signify
clearly lawful forcible R2P cases, lighter-shaded boxes signify plausibly law-
ful cases).
Figure 2: Two-Track Process for R2P Interventions
Clear and Convincing Evidence of
Genocide, Massacre Crimes Against
Humanity, or Use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction
Two-Thirds
Approval of the
U.N. General
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Regional
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Member
Regional
Organization
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Non-Member
Unilateral
Invervention by a
State or States
Go to the U.N.
Security Council
but Pre-Approval
Not Required
U.N. Security
Council
Pre-Approval
Required
Persuasive Evidence of: (1) Non-Lethal
Crimes Against Humanity; 
(2) Lethal Crimes Against Humanity 
which are not Group Extermination; 
(3) War Crimes; (4) Ethnic Cleansing; 
(5) Possession of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction
In concluding, it bears repeating that what distinguishes genocide, mas-
sacres, and the lethal use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons from all
other mass atrocities is their singular disrespect for human life. When the
state commits non-lethal crimes against humanity, it is not taking life.
When the state commits lethal war crimes or crimes against humanity, how-
ever, it is killing people. But, among lethal crimes, a line may be drawn
between those in which people are killed based on some individualized or
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objectively reasonable assessment of law enforcement or national security
need. But gassing a large group of people, or binding a large group of peo-
ple, lining them up against the wall, and shooting them, is different from
torturing people to death, or shooting protesters to death with snipers, or
killing them by indiscriminate shelling of military targets in areas with
large civilian populations. Killing groups of people at one blow without a
pretense of a law enforcement or security justification suggests intent to
eliminate the targeted group as a group. In this sense, death by group exter-
mination shows both disrespect to life and disrespect to the singularity or
uniqueness of the life taken, which is not evidenced by torture-death,
sniper-death, or bomb-death incidental to a military objective.
B. Integrating R2P and r2p
The preceding Subpart elaborated on the proposition that forcible R2P
doctrine should be framed along two tracks, with the track for mass killings
modeled on the customary international law of forcible r2p. This Subpart
asserts that r2p and forcible R2P are really one and the same concept today
and that they can be treated as one customary international law ground for
war that has subsumed the old right to use force to protect one’s own na-
tionals which used to be called humanitarian intervention as well. Both are
exceptions to the principle of exclusive sovereignty and the monopoly of the
sovereign state to coercive power within its territory. They also share the
underlying presumptions that a sovereign state has a basic responsibility to
protect civilians within its borders and that other states can intervene if the
state fails to carry out the responsibility. The only real difference between
the two is the nationality of the civilians whose lives are to be protected.
Nationality is foundational to domestic law in which rights-holders are de-
fined by allegiance to the sovereign state (or presence therein). And it is still
important with respect to peacetime international law and diplomatic rela-
tions. But it is no longer self-evident why nationality should matter for
international use-of-force rules in a world informed by R2P which has fatally
undermined the notion that exclusive sovereignty can shield a state that is
killing its civilians.
One objection to the integration of R2P and r2p is the argument that
using force to protect one’s nationals abroad falls under the legal rubric of
self-defense, which is difficult to claim for the use of force to protect foreign-
ers. As noted earlier, however, force may be used to protect not only one’s
own nationals in a distant country, but also third-country nationals. In the
latter case, a possible rejoinder would be to plead “collective self-defence,”
which is explicitly authorized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.260 But if
the international law concept of collective self-defense is powerful enough to
allow Country A to use force in Country C to protect Country B’s civilians,
260. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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it is logically powerful even enough to protect Country C’s civilians. In legal
and logical terms, it is the idea that “what Country C does to Country C’s
civilians, even killing them in groups, is Country C’s business only” that is
doing the work, and in the past dozen years R2P has been successful in
disabusing the world of that idea.
The foregoing is a sensible doctrinal rejoinder to the belief that r2p is
merely a corollary of self-defense, but more significant are real-world percep-
tions of what is at stake in a particular instance where armed force is used in
reaction to attacks on a state’s affiliates in distant places.  It seems fair to say
that when a state’s officials, properties, or instrumentalities (such as na-
tional-flagged civilian aircraft) are attacked in another country, then the case
can be made for self-defense. These people and things are the government, in
a very real sense.261 A good example is the abortive attempt in 1980 to
rescue the U.S. embassy hostages in Iran—that was an instance of the extra-
territorial use of armed force to protect U.S. nationals (who were embassy
officials) in self-defense. Another example would be U.S. military attacks
against the terrorist groups that bombed the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya in August 1998 to the extent that such operations were for the pur-
pose of preventing future attacks on U.S. embassies or officials abroad. The
Russian military intervention in Crimea in 2014 might similarly be justi-
fied under this self-defense rubric if there were any evidence that attacks on
Russian military bases there were imminent rather than imaginary.
But it is not so clear that self-defense is applicable when a state’s civilians
are at risk abroad. It is in theory possible that when a very large number of
civilian nationals are threatened with death, it is tantamount to an invasion
and therefore a case of self-defense. But if there is a smaller number of na-
tionals who are endangered, even if they are killed, it is hard to see how the
killings can be equated to an attack on the state itself. Entebbe presents the
strongest possible case of a self-defense rationale along these lines. The kill-
ing of eighty Israeli citizens in 1976 who were hijacked on an international
flight by pro-Palestinian terrorists would plausibly have been perceived by
Israel and the world community as an attack on the new state of Israel, given
its history and the backdrop of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But the case may
have been sui generis, and it is hard to imagine another case with equally
compelling facts.
Another way to rebut the idea that r2p is self-defense is to focus on the
intervener’s motives, to think about the decision to use armed force from the
perspective of the state. We have already discussed the shift in definitions of
“humanitarian intervention” among U.S. international lawyers from one
that viewed the protection of an intervening state’s own nationals as the core
of the concept to one that specifically excluded it.262 Consider, in that vein,
261. Cf. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, supra note 7, at 12. R
262. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. R
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the following passage from the fifth edition of Brierly’s Law of Nations by the
noted English international lawyer Humphrey Waldock:
Whether the landing of a detachment of troops to save the lives of
nationals under imminent threat of death or serious injury owing
to the breakdown of law and order may be justifiable is a delicate
question. Cases of this form of intervention have not been infre-
quent in the past and, when not attended by suspicion of being a
pretext for political pressure, have generally been regarded as jus-
tified by the sheer necessity of instant action to save the lives of
innocent nationals, whom the local government is unable or un-
willing to protect. Clearly every effort must be made to get the
local government to intervene effectively and, failing that, to ob-
tain its permission for independent action; equally clearly every
effort must be made to get the United Nations to act. But, if the
United Nations is not in a position to move in time and the need
for instant action is manifest, it would be difficult to deny the
legitimacy of action in defence of nationals which every responsible
government would feel bound to take, if it had the means to do so.263
A military intervention to save nationals in a foreign country is typically
undertaken because the government feels “responsible” and wants to save
the lives of its nationals if it can. Waldock does not imply that the mission
is to be undertaken because the danger presented is an attack on the state
itself (by contrast to Entebbe, from the Israeli perspective). The passage in
general shows how closely Waldock’s understanding of r2p tracked forcible
R2P. If the one word “nationals” is changed to “civilians,” then the passage
is a textbook statement of the forcible R2P rationale. Indeed, the very point
of R2P is to effect this equation as a matter of international law.
If r2p is not self-defense, then it can be put in a customary category of
lawful use of armed force to protect civilians against group extermination
that comprises both r2p and a subset of forcible R2P. This would be a cus-
tomary international law-authorized ground for war additional to the U.N.
Charter codified exceptions of self-defense and U.N. Security Council ap-
proved military operations. The category comprises the use of armed force in
an unconsenting sovereign state when (1) intended to protect civilians facing
imminent risk of group extermination by the state; (2) narrowly tailored to
present such deaths; and (3) all other reasonable means have been exhausted.
Military interventions to address other sorts of mass atrocities committed
against foreign civilians, such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or non-lethal
crimes against humanity, would still require U.N. Security Council
approval.
263. Andrew Clapham, Brierly’s Law of Nations 452–53 (7th ed. 2012) (emphasis added).
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There are two natural differences in how the basic doctrine will be applied
as to r2p cases versus R2P cases. First, because there will be far fewer of
one’s own nationals at risk in any foreign country (numbering in the
thousands at most, as opposed to hundreds of thousands or millions), r2p
missions will usually be more narrowly tailored. For instance, it may be
possible to simply evacuate the threatened civilians, especially if the host
state is otherwise peaceful and does not pose a threat to its own civilians.
Second, “an imminent risk of group extermination” in the r2p context
will typically entail a pervasive threat against one’s nationals or foreign na-
tionals (for example, anti-Americanism or anti-Europeanism) in a foreign
state that has not yet materialized in actual deaths. It is fair to say that the
proportionate use of armed force is nonetheless lawful so long as there is
good evidence of an imminent risk of group extermination. Thus, for exam-
ple, if there were credible evidence that violent Ukrainians were indeed on
the verge of killing Russian nationals and ethnic Russians, then the Russian
military intervention in the Crimea would have been lawful. By contrast,
the threshold imminent-risk determination in an R2P case would require
clear and convincing evidence of past group deaths, given the more extensive
scope of the contemplated military intervention and the implausibility of
using armed force for the proportionally limited purpose of evacuating or
rescuing all of the endangered civilians.
In all other respects, the two concepts of R2P and r2p may be treated as
one for purposes of international law. Specifically, customary international
law permits one or more states to use armed force in an unconsenting sover-
eign state to protect civilians facing an imminent risk of group extermina-
tion regardless of their nationality. If a state has surplus military power to
use armed force beyond its borders, and we accept as lawful its narrowly
tailored use of armed force to protect its own or third-country civilians fac-
ing imminent group death, then we should accept as equally lawful such use
of armed force to protect home-country civilians facing imminent group
death. Whether the state can and will use force as a matter of its own do-
mestic law and politics is a different question. But there is no reason to
conclude that current customary international law, as informed by the R2P
norm, prohibits such a use of armed force. What prevented this integration
of r2p and R2P in the past was the principle of exclusive sovereignty—the
view that a sovereign state had a monopoly of armed force within its borders
and was free to do whatever it wanted to civilians within its territory, sub-
ject to the r2p easement with respect to foreign civilians. The basic office of
R2P has been to demolish these features of exclusive sovereignty.
Conclusion
When does international law permit a state to use armed force in another
state without its consent? The question has been recently and starkly posed
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by what appear to be two very different cases: (1) the possibility of U.S.
intervention in Syria to protect local civilians from future gas attacks by the
state in 2013, and (2) the Russian intervention in the Crimea region of the
Ukraine in 2014 premised on threats to ethnic Russians there. The conven-
tional, textualist answer, which I have called the bifocal orthodoxy, is that
force is only lawful under the two grounds for war codified in the U.N.
Charter, namely, self-defense and the use of force pursuant to U.N. Security
Council authorization. Under this view, U.S. intervention in Syria would
not be lawful unless pre-authorized by the U.N. Security Council, and Rus-
sian intervention in Crimea would not be lawful unless it was justified by
self-defense or consent.
This Article has argued that there is a third, customary ground for lawful
war: a state may use armed force in another unconsenting state to protect the
lives of any civilians who have suffered group extermination or are facing an
imminent risk of it. Specifically, the customary legal justification applies
whether the civilians are citizens of the intervening state, the target state, or
some other state or states. For centuries, this special right was limited to
protecting civilians who were nationals of the intervening state or its allies,
but that has changed in the past dozen years in large part due to the influ-
ence of the cluster of ideas known as the responsibility to protect citizens, or
R2P. This Article does not make the claim that a state should use armed
force under such circumstances if it has the military resources to do so: that
is a decision controlled by the domestic law and politics of the intervening
state.
Although the armed-force component of R2P started as a repackaging of
humanitarian intervention for foreign civilians, its novel formulation lays
bare the genetic resemblance to the ancient right to use armed force to pro-
tect one’s own civilians or r2p, and also helps international lawyers see that
R2P and r2p constitute a single category of jus ad bellum. Grasping this
homology yields at least four powerful insights about R2P, r2p, the law of
war, and international law more generally.
First, we can see that using force to save one’s own civilians in a foreign
land is not the same as self-defense, and that it is, at the same time, not so
different from using force to save foreign civilians in that land. The insight
was understood by international lawyers of a prior generation, but it was lost
as mainstream international lawyers came to conceive of their subject as con-
ceptually discrete from national law and interests. An important corollary of
this conceptual insight is the fallacy of the bifocal orthodoxy: if r2p is not
self-defense but still lawful, consistent state practice in the post-World War
era, then it follows that what is codified in the U.N. Charter (self-defense or
Security Council preclearance) has never constituted the complete enumera-
tion of lawful grounds for war or jus ad bellum.
Second, recognizing that there is a single customary law rule for when a
state can use armed force in another unconsenting state to protect civilians
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regardless of nationality generates critical attention on the need to tighten
the concept of predicate offenses. Civilian-protection military interventions
without Security Council preapproval or a self-defense justification, whether
of the R2P or r2p variety, are only lawful in cases presenting clear and
convincing evidence that civilians have been or are in imminent risk of
state-sanctioned group extermination. This clarification of the customary
rule will in theory constrain powerful states from using threats to nationals
abroad as a legal basis for the use of force (as Russia did in Crimea in 2014)
and also provide a constrained capacity for unilateral intervention in extreme
cases of mass killings where the U.N. Security Council is deadlocked (as in
Syria in 2013).
Third, excavating the pre-history of r2p and its affinity to forcible R2P
helps international lawyers understand how the responsibility to protect has
evolved and its influence on relevant international law. For instance, we can
see the consequences and implications of its sovereignty veil-piercing ratio-
nale. We can also grasp how forcible R2P informs and fits into international
law governing the reasons for war.
Finally, connecting R2P and r2p illuminates a larger debate about the
method and content of international law between top-down globalists and
bottom-up sovereigntists. Public international lawyers today too often resort
exclusively to top-down efforts at lawmaking or norm development like
R2P, whether through U.N. Security Council resolutions, multilateral trea-
ties, or norm entrepreneurship by NGOs or the U.N. General Assembly.
The bifocal orthodoxy itself can be viewed as a feature of this tendency to
look for easy answers in universal texts. International lawyers need to com-
bine this type of global, top-down norm articulation with the more tradi-
tional and unwieldy bottom-up work of international lawmaking by
empirical documentation of prevalent customs or “general” principles of
municipal law observed by all or nearly all nations, like r2p,264 and by focus-
ing on incentives and interests at the sovereign state level.  As Michael
Glennon has advised: “[r]ather than starting with principles, doctrines, and
other historically controversial abstractions and then seeking consensus,” in-
ternational lawyers should “look first to the empirical data to see what con-
sensus actually exists.”265 The need to reconcile norms with what states are
264. Some countries do not accept r2p for the simple reason that only powerful countries can do it.
See, e.g., Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the
United Nations, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations app. B, at 216–17 (Rich-
ard B. Lillich ed., 1973). But the fact that practically all the countries that can do it accept r2p as lawful
is a powerful argument that it is binding custom.
265. Michael J. Glennon, Law, Power and Principles, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 378, 379–80 (2013). See
generally Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law
(2010). Cf. Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Recon-
ciliation, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 757 (2001) (describing this difference in approaches). The constant chal-
lenge, of course, is to balance sovereignty and globalist aspirations, which is an underlying aim of this
Article. For a provocative new article that seeks to strike this balance by re-conceptualizing sovereign
states as trustees for humanity, and not merely their own nationals, see Benvenisti, supra note 36. R
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actually doing out of a common sense of legal right or obligation is espe-
cially important with respect to international legal issues concerning the use
of armed force. Hersch Lauterpacht put it best: “If international law is, in
some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even
more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.”266 Bring-
ing a bottom-up focus back into international law is especially important if
international lawyers aspire to engage powerful individual states like the
United States in international law making and enforcement. The hard
course, which this Article has attempted, is to strike the right balance be-
tween the globalist impulse and the sovereigntist reality.
266. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 Brit. Y.B. of Int’l L. 360,
382 (1952).
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